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ABSTRACT
This project attempts to trace a continuity which runs from Walter Benjamin’s early writings 
on language and the coming philosophy through to his Arcades Project. Benjamin’s early 
writings on the Kantian critical system stipulate the need to bring the clarity and consistency 
of the critical system into relation with time, ephemera and history. This project argues that 
Benjamin’s early demands are developed via his encounter with the literary techniques of 
surrealism and the artistic techniques of Baudelaire’s Monsieur G. Ultimately, this work 
contends that Benjamin’s Arcades Project attempts to synthesize both the techniques 
developed in Benjamin’s middle period and the goals put forward in his early writings.
Keywords: Benjamin, Kant, Aragon, Baudelaire, critique, Arcades Project, surrealism, 
messianism, angel of history, reason, knowledge, experience, judgement, post-humanism.
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1
I n t r o  d u c t i o  n
This thesis argues that Walter Benjamin’s historical materialism can be rightfully interpreted 
as the culmination of his most coherent and productive early writings — “On Language as 
Such and On the Language of Man” (1916) and “On the Program of the Coming 
Philosophy” (1918). Benjamin’s writings are famous for both their scope and their 
unconventional fragmentary and essayistic style. In contrast to the overwhelming majority of 
philosophers, whose contributions to the history of philosophy can be localized in one or 
several magnum opuses, Benjamin tends to favour modes of expression which fall outside the 
purview of conventional academic writings. His sprawling literary and philosophical corpus, 
which also includes personal correspondences, doctoral dissertations, dialogues, reviews and 
radio programmes, leaves interpreters to orient themselves within the ambiguous 
coordinates of a legacy which shirks localization. His monumental Arcades Project, which 
shares the physical presence of many of the great works of the philosophical tradition, departs 
from the analogy in its well documented status as an unfinished project which might never 
have been intended for publication.
Benjamin’s intellectual influences, which can only in part reveal themselves in his 
correspondences and citations, are at least as diverse as his productions. In Benjamin’s brief 
life he found himself in the company of the foremost representatives of the Marburg 
school of neo-Kantian interpretation, several of Husserl’s most prominent students, and the 
French surrealists. He kept close personal correspondences with many of the great 
European intellectuals of the first half of the twentieth century, including the leading figures 
of the Frankfurt school, Zionist theologians, poets, and Nazi political philosophers.
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Benjamin’s letters suggest periods of undivided attention to the study of the history of 
Catholic dogma, and his Habilitationsschrift concerns a literary form — the German Mourning 
Play — which had been virtually lost to the tradition of modem philology before his 
engagement with it. Benjamin’s famous rejection from the German academic establishment 
in 1925 absolved him of the disciplinary strictures of conventional academic research, but 
also absolved him of the academic responsibility of clarifying the range of his influences. 
Benjamin’s writings are both obscure in their origins and transdisciplinary, or even 
undisciplinary, in their execution. Consequently, it is a daunting task to begin to parse 
through his writings to unearth the formative influences and antagonists which foreground 
and resurface throughout his work.
We have been lucky enough to embark upon the project in the wake of several 
decisive recent interventions in the field of Benjamin scholarship. In contradistinction from 
the great majority of Benjamin scholarship of the past thirty years, which pays 
disproportionate emphasis to Benjamin’s later writings, several recent scholars, notably Peter 
Fenves (2011) and Howard Caygill (1998), have attempted to demonstrate the rigorous and 
compelling structure of Benjamin’s often fragmentary early works. Their efforts, including 
several translations of important minor works, have endowed Benjamin scholarship with a 
compelling new orientation towards his writings as a whole. Their research elaborates the 
extent to which Kantian idealism and German phenomenology figure into Benjamin’s early 
reflections on language and colour In Fenves’ The Messianic Reduction Fenves suggests that 
Benjamin’s conceptions of experience can be interpreted as an attempt to enrich the 
phenomenological reduction to the natural attitude with a messianic injunction toward 
ceaseless purification through considerations of culture and history (MR; 3). Likewise, 
Caygill suggests in his 1998 work The Colour o f  Experience that Benjamin’s early writings can
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be understood as a “‘comprehension and recasting’ of Kant’s transcendental concept of 
experience into a speculative one” (CE; 1). This is accomplished, according to Caygill, 
through Benjamin’s challenge to Kant’s conception of the forms of intuition. Benjamin, 
according to Caygill, attempts to replace “Kant’s forms of intuition (space and time) with 
colour as a (transitive and shifting) medium of intuition” (CE; 82).
Despite their laudable accomplishments, Caygill and Fenves tend to refrain from an 
elaboration of their research into an interpretation of Benjamin’s later writings, barring 
several notable exceptions, including Caygill’s attempts to account for Benjamin’s ‘city 
diaries.’ Instead, Caygill and Fenves for the most part limit themselves to Benjamin’s writings 
before the mid 1920s. Consequently, there remain many potential avenues through which to 
explore the persistent elements of Benjamin’s early essays in his later works.
This thesis develops one such line of inquiry. It attempts to show the development 
of a trajectory in Benjamin’s writings that begins with his early encounter with Kant and 
ends with the intentions and methodologies which foreground the Arcades Project. Along the 
way the argument develops the suggestion that Benjamin’s middle period engagements with 
surrealism and the historical question of Paris in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries are a 
transitional elaboration, a partial fulfilment, of the task for philosophy set out in his early 
writings.
More explicitly, the first chapter of this project attempts to develop a sense of both 
the intention and the underlying theoretical consistency of Benjamin’s early writings. 
Benjamin’s early writings are littered with indications of his estimation of Kant above 
almost any other figure in intellectual history. Of Kant’s many virtues, main one Benjamin 
identifies is his unprecedented pursuit of clarity and justification as the end, instead of the 
means, of philosophy. Kant inaugurates the systematic tradition of German idealism, and in
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many ways remains its most perfect example. His demand for a rigorous theory of 
transcendental knowledge was unrelenting Yet Benjamin maintains that Kant falls short of 
accounting for the claim of ephemeral experience in his work. His formulation of the 
transcendental consciousness might be adequate to the time and space of mechanistic 
Enlightenment experience, but it is inadequate to religious or historical experience before or 
after Kant. Consequently, while Kant’s transcendental philosophy is preeminent in the 
tradition, it remains insufficient. Having established the tension between Kant and 
Benjamin, the chapter goes on to develop Benjamin’s approach to the resolution of the 
question of the insufficiency of Kant’s theory of knowledge. This is developed through 
Benjamin’s attempt to articulate the speculative structure that perfect knowledge would have, 
while making explicit the theological and philosophical obstructions which bar its fulfilment. 
Benjamin’s response to Kant in his essay on language and his essay on the coming 
philosophy produces a curious orientation for the philosopher He is poised between his 
obligation to the pursuit of clear and justified knowledge of the world, but he is conscious 
of the ultimate insufficiency of his capacities. Benjamin’s early philosophy attempts to 
rectify the shortcomings of Kant’s transcendental subject, but the result is a philosophical 
system that is always already outside of itself.
The second chapter of this thesis attempts to extend the analyses of the first chapter 
into an interpretation of Benjamin’s varied writings from the 1920s and 30s. The chapter 
begins with an account of Charles Baudelaire’s famous modernist essay “The Painter of 
Modem Life.” Baudelaire’s account of fashion and beauty concentrates the figure of 
'ephemeral experience,’ which for Benjamin bars the fulfilment of the Kantian project. 
Baudelaire’s essay is as much an articulation of the character of modem life—modem life as 
ephemeral experience—as it is a preliminary attempt to develop a method of knowing
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which is appropriate to such experience. Thus it promises an initial strategy that Benjamin 
might employ to reconcile his early demand for a rigorous purification of the theory of 
knowledge with his recognition of the ephemeral. The chapter proceeds to uncover the 
tradition of surrealist writing which emerges in the image of Baudelaire. Benjamin spent a 
considerable amount of time in Paris in the 1920s and 30s, and exchanged extensive 
correspondences with the surrealists. His correspondences suggest that Benjamin felt an 
immense intellectual kinship with their early efforts. The most famous literary productions 
of the surrealists involve the translation of the artistic methods of recording the ephemeral 
which Baudelaire outlines in his “The Painter of Modem Life” into a literary idiom. The 
surrealists move the content of nineteenth century lithographs into twentieth century 
“magical experiments with words,” to quote Benjamin’s description of their writings in 1929. 
These diverse figures came to influence Benjamin’s productive philosophical development. 
They promised a means toward the beginning of the task of translating ephemeral 
experience into knowledge. The essay concludes with the suggestion that many of 
Benjamin’s writings from the early 1930s, including “On Unpacking my Library” and “One 
Way Street,” can be understood as attempts to re-appropriate the techniques of Baudelaire 
and the surrealists in the service of Benjamin’s early project.
The third chapter of the project, which serves in a way as its conclusion, seeks to 
situate the culmination of Benjamin’s early and middle period writings in the question of the 
infinite task in relation to Benjamin’s Arcades Project. As intimated above, Benjamin’s early 
essays outline the obligations of the philosopher in the present, but simultaneously disavow 
the possibility of any immediately available fulfilment of her work. Nonetheless, Benjamin’s 
essays do not preclude such a possibility from all future eventualities. It is important to note 
that the essay “On the Coming Philosophy” is not an essay “On the Impossible Philosophy.”
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This chapter develops an account of the robust theological structures which accompany 
Benjamin’s philosophical development, namely the weak messianism which attains its most 
concerted expression in his 1916 essay “On Language as Such” and, much later, in the 
“Theses on the Concept of History.” By interpreting the figure of Angelus Norus as a 
symbolic representation of the historical materialist—located somewhere between the divine 
and the profane—and situating it in relation to Benjamin’s weak messianism, we conclude 
that the Arcades Project is the trace remainder of a process which continues uncompleted 
until the time of its theological resolution.
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C h a p t e r  1 : T h e  K a n t i a n  R o o t s  o f  t h e  C o m i n g
P h i l o s o p h y
1.1 ON BENJAMIN AND THE KANTIAN CRITIQUE
The object of this chapter is to lay the groundwork for a unique reinterpretation of 
Benjamin’s later writings, namely his work on surrealism and his Arcades Project, via a 
consideration of the tension evinced in Benjamin’s early writings between his encounter with 
the timelessness of the Kantian critical philosophy and his own theory of spiritual 
immanence, a theory which attempts to extend the scope of experience treated by Kant to 
the domain of new regions of religious or historical experience.
Benjamin's oeuvre is often characterized as fragmentary and essayistic. Norbert Bolz 
writes in “Aesthetics? Philosophy of History? Theology!”, his recent essay on Benjamin, 
anthologized in Gerhard Richter's Benjamin's Ghosts, that Benjamin’s writings comprise an 
anti-theory of sorts, a body of work which is fragmentary instead of total, immanent instead 
of mediated, in the legacy of Romantics such as Friederich Schlegel. Bolz writes that 
“instead of the system, [Benjamin provides] just an “attempt”; instead of philosophy, just 
literary scholarship; instead of world mystery, just conjectures” (BG, 227). The immanent 
quality of Benjamin’s writings, as well as his emphasis on the latent spiritual [geistig] 
dimensions of experience lends credibility to Bolz's interpretation. Likewise, Benjamin's 
reticence to engage in systematic philosophizing, his preference for critical literary genres, 
and the uncompleted quality of his writings bolster this interpretive gesture.
Yet despite compelling evidence, Benjamin's eady writings contain many suggestions 
that he is much closer to the systematic critical philosophy of the neo-Kantians and
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phenomenologists than the majority of recent reflections on his legacy maintain. In a letter
to Gerhard [Gershom] Scholem from October 22nd, 1917, Benjamin writes that
Although I still have no proof of this, it is my firm belief that, in keeping 
with the spirit of philosophy and thus of doctrine to which it belongs (that is, 
if it does not perhaps constitute doctrine in its entirety), there will never be 
any question of the Kantian system's being shaken and toppled. Rather, the 
question is much more one of the system's being set in granite and universally 
developed. (Corr, 9 7)
Likewise, in his 1918 work “On the Program of the Coming Philosophy” Benjamin
maintains that “[i]t is of the greatest importance for the philosophy of the future to
recognize and sort out which elements of the Kantian philosophy should be adopted and
cultivated, which should be reworked, and which should be rejected” (SW1,101-102). What
Benjamin hopes to adopt and cultivate is never in fact made explicit in his various
publications, but these statements suggest that there is a more extensive dialogue between
Benjamin's philosophy of immanence and the critical structure of the Kantian philosophy. It
is left to us as interpreters to address the tension between critique and immanence in
Benjamin's writing.
But what is this thing called critique and why should it concern us? We can begin by 
asking what qualities of the Kantian critical philosophy might have appealed to Benjamin. 
What might have driven Benjamin to view the critical philosophy as the groundwork, or 
stepping stone of the philosophy of the future? Likewise, we are forced to confront the 
complex question of whether or not Benjamin’s later works fulfil, surpass, or disappoint the 
program suggested by his seemingly prophetic early essay. And so, we turn to Kant and his 
Critique o f  Pure Reason.
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1.2 ON THE KANTIAN SYSTEM
The object of the following section is to explore the Kantian critical project with an eye to 
what Benjamin might have meant when he wrote “there will never be any question of the 
Kantian system’s being shaken and toppled” (Corr, 97). What aspects of Kantian critique 
lend themselves to this robust statement? Are the unshakable elements of Kant’s project 
inherent in the conclusions of his inquiry, or merely inherent in the form of the Copemican 
turn?
Kant’s Critique o f  Pure Reason crowns the Enlightenment struggle to determine the
limits and powers of reason. According to Kant’s original preface, the history of philosophy
up until the eighteenth century was characterized by a struggle between various species of
dogmatism, namely idealism and empiricism, or else a prevailing cultural attitude of
scepticism bordering on indifferentism (A viii- A xi). In a now famous characterization that
introduces the Critique o f  Pure Reason, Kant writes that
[hjuman reason has the peculiar fate in one species of its cognitions that it is 
burdened with questions which it cannot dismiss, since they are given to it as 
problems by the nature of reason itself, but which it also cannot answer, since 
they transcend every capacity of human reason. (A vii)
According to Kant, the consequence of the ’peculiar fate’ of reason is a seemingly endless
circulation of partial and incomplete attempts to rebuild systems of philosophical
knowledge. In his section on the antinomies of pure reason Kant suggests four fundamental
sites of metaphysical dispute which characterize the history of modem philosophy. These
are specified as questions concerning the infinite expanse or first cause of the universe, the
simplicity or divisibility of substance, the question of whether human subjects are causality
determined or free and the question of whether beings in the world are necessary or
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contingent. According to Kant’s reading of the modem tradition, in the face of these 
questions thinkers either resigned themselves from the pursuit of any answer to these 
questions, or else they have sought, through the various camps of dogmatism, to concretely 
and systematically account for them. The resigned subject renounces philosophy, while 
dogmatic subjects answer the call of metaphysics with edifices, which, viewed from the 
perspective of the wider tradition, are in insupportable contradiction with one another
In answer to the storied history of metaphysics, Kant proposes a 'Copemican 
revolution' of sorts which breaks with the tradition of attempting to “establish something 
about objects before they are given to us” and instead assumes that “the objects [of 
experience] must conform to our cognition” (B xvi). This shift is decisive insofar as the 
critical philosophy suspends its preoccupation with the nature of the world—and questions 
such as those concerning its simplicity or divisibility—and turns instead to investigate the 
mechanisms of cognition itself. In other words, philosophers before Kant attempted to 
make necessary claims about the constitution of the world through an examination of the 
objects of experience. Yet, the experiential category of “all objects of experience” is never 
available to us as finite human knowers. Our experience is necessarily finite since there can 
always be, as the expression goes, a 'black swan' which might interrupt whatever account of 
'all swans’ we might have deduced from our experience of the world. The dogmatic 
antagonisms that characterize early modem philosophy result from independent camps 
inferring from their finite experience some claim about the necessary constitution of 
experience as such.
Approached from the Copemican turn, which takes the objects of experience as 
given, a systematic account of the structures of cognition, the process whereby all 
experience is mediated in its totality, might offer a means toward restoring necessary claims
11
regarding experience to the scope of the process of philosophy. By suspending his 
judgement or decision pertaining to constitution of the objects of experience and affirming 
their givenness1, Kant opens himself to the possibility of an unmediated access to the 
mechanisms by which cognition synthesizes and absorbs the stuff of experience. The result 
is Kant’s systematic exploration of the means by which cognition makes sense of given 
objects. In lieu of looking to the “objects of experience before they are given to us” Kant 
opts to look for the necessary features of our cognition of objects of experience. He writes 
that “[t]hus as exaggerated and contradictory as it may sound to say that the [human] 
understanding is itself the source of the laws of nature [as they appear to us], and thus of 
the formal unity of nature, such an assertion is nevertheless correct and appropriate to the 
object, namely experience” (A 127).
Kant’s decisive break with the tradition of philosophy demands the invention of a 
new method. In articulating the necessary laws of cognition Kant maintains that he reveals 
the fundamental structure of the process of human cognition and experience (at least as it is 
knowable to us) which had, so the argument goes, been lying unnoticed all along. The 
structure of human cognition is conceived such that its revelation, by means of its self- 
evidence, is forever-after indisputable. Instead of deducing structures from the concrete 
appearances of the world, it is as if  Kant plucked the laws that structure all human cognition 
of experience from thin air Proceeding from what is apparently least concrete, namely some 
faculty of making sense of a world that is never manifestly presented to us, Kant discovers 
the most indisputable laws of nature. Insights into the laws that necessarily determine 
experience are won not by inference from objects in the world, but rather through the 
abstraction of a cognitive anatomy of sorts that, accordingly, accounts for all necessary
i A  givenness, which, it must be emphasized, is restricted to human knowers.
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structures of human cognition.
How one might decide where to begin the development of this anatomy within the
unwieldy totality of the human world is monstrous in its ambiguity. Kant affirms this when
he suggests that even the most basic philosophical distinction, namely that between
cognition and experience, is fraught with overlapping and interdependent relations
[t]here is no doubt whatever that all our cognition begins with experience; for 
how else should the cognitive faculty be awakened into exercise if not through 
objects that stimulate our senses and in part themselves produce 
representations, in part bring the activity of our understanding into motion to 
compare these, to connect or separate them, and thus to work up the raw 
material of sensible impressions into a cognition of objects that is called 
experience? [...] But although all our cognition commences with experience, 
yet it does not on that account all arise from experience. For it could well be 
that even our experiential cognition is a composite of that which we receive 
through impressions and that which our own cognitive faculty (merely 
prompted by sensible impressions) provides out of itself which addition we 
cannot distinguish from that fundamental material until long practice has made 
us attentive to it and skilled in separating it out. (B1 — B2)
Although experience and cognition might receive a preliminary categorical distinction, their
distinct natures are not immediately obvious. While cognition is "awakened5 by experience,
this does not mean that cognition is stricdy a function of experience. There might be some
remainder, according to Kant, which subsists on its own. Likewise, experience, although it
presents itself as if  it were immediately available, might always already carry the colourings
of cognition. Experience, which seemingly presents itself as simple, might well be composite
by virtue of the undetected structuring principles of the cognitive faculty. Since Kant
intends to treat cognition before experience, he must somehow parse cognition from
experience and further reduce cognition to its constitutive elements.
Kant elaborates his qualification of the anatomy of cognition through defining
cognition as a power comprised of the chimerical actions of two elements, impressions and
conceptual activities. This distinction maintains the ambiguous interrelation of experience
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and the cognitive faculty. Kant writes that
[o]ur cognition arises from two fundamental sources in the mind, the first of 
which is the reception of representations (the receptivity of impressions), the 
second the faculty for cognizing an object by means of these representations 
(spontaneity of concepts); through the former an object is given to us, 
through the latter it is thought in relation to that representation (as a mere 
determination of the mind). Intuition and concepts therefore constitute the 
elements of all our cognition, so that neither concepts without intuition 
corresponding to them in some way nor intuition without concepts can yield a 
cognition. Both are either pure or empirical. (B74)
While cognition is comprised of “two fundamental sources,” they are, according to Kant’s
framework, available to independent scrutiny. Further, through his qualification that “both
are either pure or empirical” Kant signals that there is something experiential in conceptual
and intuitive activity, but importantly something that is pure, or a priori as well. This
qualification enables Kant to isolate the ‘transcendental’ aspects in both elements of
cognition, which is to say aspects which hold for all possible human experience. Kant
undertakes the refinement and discovery of whatever necessity or a priori elements might
inhere in intuition and the concepts in the chapters of the Critique o f  Pure Reason entitled the
“Transcendental Aesthetic” and the “Transcendental Analytic” respectively.
Kant’s “Transcendental Aesthetic” both articulates the mechanics of the faculty of
intuition apart from considerations of the faculty of the understanding, as well as argues for
the thesis that all intuitions are presented to human subjects according to the forms of space
and time. Kant’s inquiry deliberately suspends any speculation regarding the constitution of
experiential objects in themselves and thus only holds for the formal conditions through
which appearances are presented to human cognition. Within Kant’s technical terminology it
is important to maintain that intuition is the term granted to the faculty as a whole, while
appearance is the term designated for that which actually presents itself in intuition. Kant’s
decisive intervention in what otherwise might constitute an empiricist account of the
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intuitive ground of experience is his affirmation that all appearances, if  they are intelligible 
to us, must be ordered according to certain formal principles, namely space and time, which 
cannot be empirically abstracted from appearance.
Kant divides all sensation into two distinct groups, those belonging to the outer sense 
and the inner sense. "Outer sense’ is the means by which all objects that we represent as 
outside ourselves are presented to us. Outer sense, according to Kant, is necessarily spatial 
for the human knower. Kant provides a number of arguments in support of this conclusion. 
He writes that
Space is not an empirical concept that has been drawn from outer experiences.
For in order for certain sensations to be related to something outside me (i.e., 
to something in another place in space from that in which I find myself), thus 
in order for me to represent them as outside one another, thus not merely as 
different but as in different places, the representation of space must already be 
their ground. (A 23)
According to Kant’s first argument for the ideality of space, we cannot imagine any scenario
whereby sensations are not presented always already ordered in space. To abstract space from
the objects of experience we must already be able to distinguish objects as occupying distinct
spaces from one another. But since said objects are already spatially distinguished from one
another, this abstraction is not an empirical conclusion, but rather the form in which space is
always available to us. Kant’s next argument maintains that space is not the product of
appearances. He affirms that while we might be able to think of a space that is empty of
objects, this does not entail that there is no space. Therefore it must be affirmed that space
should “be regarded as the condition of the possibility of appearances” but “not as a
determination which is dependent on them” (A24).
The other side of Kant’s division, namely "inner sense’, designates the field of
sensibility whereby the ""mind intuits itself, or its inner state” (A22 — A23). According to
Kant’s second section of the ""Transcendental Aesthetic” all inner sense is given through the
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a priori form of time. Kant’s argument for the ideality of time in many ways mirrors his 
argument for the ideality of space. He affirms that “[t]ime is not an empirical concept that is 
somehow drawn from an experience. For simultaneity or succession would not themselves 
come into perception if the representation of time did not ground them a priori^ (A30). If 
we were to empirically abstract time from inner sense, according to Kant’s argument, it 
would be necessary for us to first conceive of representations in terms of succession or 
simultaneity, otherwise we would have no means of orienting ourselves in this deduction. But 
in that case, simultaneity and succession, in other words time, would already be given to us. 
Therefore time provides the a priori formal condition of all intuitions of inner sense. Kant 
proceeds toward another example that affirms his conclusion by maintaining that while we 
might think of a scenario in which there are no appearances in time, this is not 
commensurate with unthinking time. Appearances “could all disappear, but time itself, as the 
universal condition of their possibility, cannot be removed ” (A31).
Through establishing space and time as the formal conditions of all sensibility for 
human knowers Kant satisfies the conditions of his ‘Copemican turn’. Leaving aside any 
consideration of the constitution of experience in itself, and thus any metaphysical 
conclusions drawn from an experience which is of necessity finite, Kant’s assertion of the 
ideality of space and time establishes transcendental principles of appearance as they must be 
for us.
Having established certain universal principles in the presentation of the immediate 
intuitive component of all cognition, Kant’s proceeds to articulate the universal principles 
that structure the mediate activity of translating intuition into knowledge, via the mechanism 
of conceptual activity. This is the object of the following section of the critique, entided the 
“Transcendental Analytic.”
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Kant maintains that we can think the activity of the faculty of the understanding in 
isolation from the activity of the faculty of intuition. While the faculty of intuition is 
responsible for the immediate reception of appearance, the faculty of the understanding is 
responsible for ordering these diverse appearances according to categories of understanding. 
In distinction from space and time, which are the forms of intuition and result from the 
particular way in which human subjects receive appearance, the categories are the necessary 
structures through which human subjects process appearances into judgements. To think the 
understanding apart from intuition demands that we attend to the forms by which intuitions 
are taken up into the understanding. According to Kant we can “trace all actions of the 
understanding back to judgement” (A 69). While we might conceive of a potentially 
unlimited field of different judgements—“this cat is black”—^ant maintains that “[i]f we 
abstract from all content of a judgement in general, and attend only to the mere form of the 
understanding in it, we find that the function of thinking in that can be brought under four 
titles, each of which contains under itself three moments.” (A 70) All judgements can be 
reduced to the combination of different parts of these twelve > formal groups. Kant’s 
conclusion regarding the necessary : forms of judgement, like his investigation in the 
“Transcendental Aesthetic” does not seek to establish anything about the fundamental nature 
of experience. It refers merely to the structure of human cognition in general.
Kant’s next step is to examine'how his account of judgement relates to intuition. 
Since judgement is responsible for the process of the relation of different intuitions, it 
remains to be established how these intuitions, which have only so far been defined as a 
spatially and temporally arranged manifold, might be grouped so as to be related by 
judgement. Kant proposes that there are twelve categories which are spontaneously 
employed by the understanding to group the manifold of spatially and temporally
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determined appearances so they can be taken up by judgement. Consequently, he discovers 
another necessary mechanism of cognition that arises coincident with, but independent of 
all experience. Kant writes that “ [t]he same function that gives unity to the different 
representations in a judgement also gives unity to the mere synthesis of different 
representations in an intuition, which, expressed generally, is called the pure concept of 
understanding ” (A 79).
According to Kant, the “Transcendental Aesthetic” and his “Transcendental 
Analytic” exhaust the field of synthetic knowledge of the human world which is available to 
the human subject with apodictic certainty. Constructively, this restores the status of 
philosophy by producing a robust account of the transcendental structures that underpin the 
domain of human experience. At the same time, the critical project invalidates the 
conclusions of the vast majority of the history of metaphysics by limiting the professed 
scope of philosophy’s access to truth. The “Transcendental Dialectic,” the subsequent 
chapter of Kant’s critique, suggests that pure reason has no claim to knowledge of the soul, 
of god, or the constitution of the world. Since the ‘human world’ is constituted in its totality 
by a combination of experience, which cannot be transcendentally qualified except in its 
presentation within the forms of space and time and a faculty of cognition which is limited 
in its transcendental content to the structure of its judgements and the concepts by which it 
necessarily organizes the manifold of intuition, any transcendental assertions outside the 
purview of these limitations represent an extension of the jurisdiction of reason beyond its 
allotted boundaries.
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1.3 O n the Scope of K antian K nowledge
One of great virtues, if  not the greatest virtue of the Kantian critical philosophy is Kant’s 
awe-inspiring ability as a conceptualizer. By way of the division of judgement into analytic and 
synthetic conceptual categories, as well as his division of all knowledge into the a posteriori and a 
priori, Kant inaugurates, from sheer thought alone, a framework through which to judge the 
transcendental status of his conceptual anatomy of cognition and experience. The distinct 
varieties of judgement {analytic and synthetii) and knowledge {a posteriori and a priori) and their 
implicit qualifications, serve not only to legitimate the conclusions of Kant’s Copemican 
investigations, but also invalidate the results of the metaphysical tradition before Kant. 
Analytic a p rior i knowledge amounts to little more than tautology, while synthetic a posteriori 
knowledge is denied any claim on the status of the necessities governing the world. By virtue 
of Kant’s conceptual structure, any philosophical investigation that proceeds from 
experience in lieu of cognition is barred from providing an apodictically certain account of 
what is.
A curious paradox that exposes the absolutism concealed in the modesty of the 
‘Copemican turn’ emerges from Kant’s capacities as a conceptualizer. While the critical 
philosophy professes to articulate a subject who occupies a finite world, barred from any 
encounter with the noumenal content of the world in itself, the critical philosophy 
simultaneously has the obverse effect of familiarizing the totality of experience, of 
invalidating the claim on truth of any experience of the world which stands outside of the 
mechanics of the transcendental subject. Adorno puts it succinctly in his lecture series on 
Kant when he notes that
thus underling that duplication [namely, the duplication of the world into the
noumenal and the phenomenal] stands the idea that our world, the world of
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experience, really has become a world familiar to us; the world in which we live .
has ceased to be ruled by mysterious, unexplained powers. Instead, it is 
something we experience as our world in the sense that we encounter nothing 
that is incompatible with our own rationality. [...] The world has ceased to be 
permeated by the ruins, by the surviving vestiges of a metaphysical meaning 
that even in its present fragmentary and elusive shape assumes the frightening 
and demonic visage that it possessed in the art and philosophy of the baroque , 
age with which we are essentially concerned here.” (AK, 110)
As much as Kant outlines the finitude of the human subject and the contingency of the
modes of cognition that foreground her experience of the world, the totalizing precision of
the transcendental conditions of the possibility of experience solidifies the ontological
assumptions that comprise the critical project and their implications.
In circumscribing the limits of reason while consolidating an indisputable account of
its mechanics, Kant effectively announces the secular subject of modernity. Intuitions are
presented to the subject within the forms of space and time. They are always presented in
between the past and future, between the infinitely small and the infinitely large, the
beginning and end of time. The infinitely small and the infinitely large, as well as the distant
(perhaps infinite) beginning and end of time are in themselves unavailable to the subject,
except as ideas o f  pure reason. The subject is so finite that not only are they lodged in a finite
place in space and time, but even more damningly, any adequate conception of the domain
(which is to say its scope and limits) of the space and time in which he is finitely imbedded is
never available to him. Every attempt to think the infinite domain of space can always be
surpassed by a second attempt to think that domain plus one.
Any ‘knowledge’ of the world that is bom out of formally determined temporal and
spatial experience, which is to say all synthetic a posteriori knowledge, is consequently of a
necessarily finite character In light of the qualification of all experiences of the subject as
finite, metaphysical questions such as questions concerning the nature of the world, the soul
and causality are forever barred from human knowers. While Kant’s later practical
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philosophy articulates a moral structure and categorical imperative which ostensibly satisfy 
the co n d it io n  o f  th e  p e cu l ia r  fa t e  o f  human r ea son , n am ely  “that it is b u rd en ed  w ith  
questions which it cannot dismiss, since they are given to it as problems by the nature of 
reason itself” (A vii), the Critique o f  Pure Reason effectively produces a subject that is 
equipped to accept the apparatuses of modem technical life tout court She is excluded, by 
virtue of the necessary finitude of alb her intuitions, from any encounter with the absolute2 
that is sufficient for knowledge. This subject is a Western Enlightenment subject, who has no 
sense of spaces or times of the sacred. In the absence of such knowledge, in the space of 
the finite between, the reduction of the world of things to a practical and fluctuating system 
of exchange value presents no offensive odour. Tradition atrophies. Its claim to esoteric 
truth and meaning has no place within the procession of intuitions of modernity. The latent 
power of the symbolic withers only to be replaced by succeeding flashes of ephemeral 
fashion. The critically circumscribed subject, barred from the absolute, reflects on comings 
and goings without recourse to any concrete orientation in the course of events beyond a 
categorical imperative and the minimal formal and categorical structures which foreground 
intuition and understanding. The Kantian subj ect is subject to the law of the between and it is 
obligated by this between to renounce the claims of the spirit of different places and times, be
they religious or profane, in lieu of an absolute embeddedness in modem experience.
( '
2 Kant does make space for the infinite, or absolute, within his critical system. But it is an infinite
which is present to the subject mediated by the imagination. It is an idea o f reason (be it, o f the nature o f  
God or the immortal soul) that is encountered purely intellectually. The infinite'in Kant is a regulative 
principle, instead o f  a constitutive principle (Guyer, Kant, 234). Judgments which incorporate the ideas o f  
pure reason do not amount to knowledge, but rather faith.
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1.4 K ant and the Roots of Benjamin .
Kant’s critical structure, in its systematic consistency, does not invite compromise or
gradation. In asserting the revelation of the systematically related necessary formal and
categorical structures of human experience, the critical philosophy demands the closure or
reconfiguration of singular historical/cultural experiences whose distributions of truth and
knowledge are ordered according to principles heterogeneous to the Kantian system. Any
site of religious knowledge or. revelation is transformed in its encounter with the Kantian
philosophy into an ethically oriented site of religious fa ith . :
The subject for whom the Kantian system does not account has a number of
choices. They can replace philosophy and its search for necessity with a profession or
affirmation of religious faith, but this gesture effectively extends the Kantian system. Or,
they can choose to ignore the Kantian system and philosophize territories of experience that
stand outside of the purview of the Kantian conceptual anatomy. Both of these responses
threaten a facile reassertion of the dogmatism or indifferentism which characterized pre-
Kantian philosophy. Consequently, neither response is an option for Benjamin. Benjamin’s
letters and essays suggest that his encounter with the critical project revealed a system with a
certain unshakable power, which not only could not be ignored, but demanded elaboration
and universalization. Benjamin writes to Gershom Scholem in 1917 that
Although I still have no proof of this, it is my firm belief that, in keeping with 
the spirit of philosophy and thus of doctrine to which it belongs (that is, if  it 
does not perhaps constitute doctrine in its entirety), there will never be any 
question of the Kantian system’s being shaken and toppled. Rather, the 
question is much more one of the system’s being set in granite and universally 
developed. (CB, 97)
As numerous commentators have emphasized (among them Caygill and Fenves), one of the
only, unifying strands in Benjamin’s early literary and philosophical works (1914 - 1921) is a
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persistent engagement with Kant. Something in the Kantian system resists dismissal and 
demands redemption. Benjamin develops a very sparse account of which elements,of the 
Kantian system sustain its claim on his thinking, but his 1918 essay “On the Program of the 
Coming Philosophy” provides some indication.
: The work begins by asserting that “[t]he central task of the coming philosophy will 
be to take the deepest intimations it draws from our times and our expectation of a great 
future, and turn them into knowledge by relating them to the Kantian system” (SW1, 100). 
From the outset, Benjamin announces that the philosophy of the future entails a certain 
responsibility to a field of the indeterminate and suggestive present, as well as a future
pregnant with expectation and possibility. The injunction to relate these fields to the Kantian
•> /
system implies some gap between what the Kantian system has succeeded in accomplishing 
and the potential the system contains to encompass that gap. Something which suggests
Y. ' .
itself in the present, and equally something which hangs in the great future, be it lived or 
scientific experience3 demands, according to Benjamin, to be brought into relation to the 
Kantian system.
Benjamin elaborates the above passage to Scholem and indicates that he by no means 
accepts the Kantian system in its entirety. He writes that “no matter how great the number 
of Kantian minutiae that may have to fade away, his system’s typology must last forever” 
(Corr, 97). The work of reconciling the Kantian system with the field with which the 
philosophy of the future grapples is as much a work of reconciliation, as it is a work of 
identifying which parts of the Kantian system to preserve and which to dispense with. In 
this spirit Benjamin writes in “On the Coming Philosophy” that “[i]t is of the greatest
3 Peter Fenves, in the Messianic Reduction emphasizes the significant coincidence in the fact that 
Benjamin composed “On the Coming Philosophy” in Bern, shortly after Albert Einstein composed his 
preliminary sketches on the theory o f  relativity (MR, 177).
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importance for the philosophy of the future to recognize and sort out which elements of the 
Kantian philosophy should be adopted and cultivated, which should be reworked, and which 
should be rejected” (SW l, 102). _
Shortly after his introduction Benjamin signals one of the principal ‘elements’ of the 
Kantian system should be preserved and cultivated when he writes that “Kant is the most 
recent of those philosophers for whom what mattered was ■ not primarily the scope and 
depth of knowledge but first and foremost its justification, and with the exception of Plato
he is possibly the only one” (SW l, 100). In lieu of pursuing depth in philosophy for its own
■ r.
sake, in other words a baroque metaphysics for the sake of metaphysics, Benjamin maintains
that the Kantian philosophical system is guided by a pursuit of the justification of its
/
conceptual structures. In “On the Coming Philosophy” Benjamin does not go into any great 
detail with respect to an investigation of the question of judgement, but his 1916 work “On 
Language as Such and On the Language of Man” suggests a fertile avenue for exploring 
what Kant’s emphasized virtue might entail. In the essay, Benjamin suggests that judgement
arises in the wake of the fall of man, wherein language profanely proliferates and loses its
( ■ - . \ 
divine correspondence to creation. In humanity’s fall from grace the direct relation between
human language and the word of God—in other words, the created world—is broken.
Benjamin writes that “[i]n the Fall, since the eternal purity of names was violated, the sterner
purity of the judging word arose” (SW l, 71). The judging word, according to Benjamin,
mediates the severed divinity of men with their divine origin. While we will elaborate
Benjamin’s theory of language and judgement further on in the thesis, for now it suffices to
suggest the quasi-divine quality Benjamin accords to the function of judgement and
justification. In suggesting that Kant is exceptional in the tradition of philosophy for his
pursuit, first and foremost, of the justification of knowledge, Benjamin emphasizes the need
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for a philosophy of the future to equal this standard.
In another letter to Gershom Scholem written in 1917, the year between “On 
Language” (1916) and “On the Program of the Coming Philosophy” . (1918), Benjamin 
makes another claim concerning the exceptional in the work of Kant, namely that “Kantian 
terminology is probably the only philosophical terminology that in its entirety did not only 
arise but was created” (CB, 103). Kant’s exceptionality in the pursuit of the justification of 
knowledge accords with the exceptionality of his capacities as a creator of philosophical 
terminology. According to Benjamin’s philosophy of language, postlapsarian language 
proliferates infinitely around the referents of its otiginary divine signification, capturing 
elements and moments of insight, but never adequately encompassing its object. Judgement 
and the judging word is that which serves to mediate between these wild linguistic 
proliferations. Through its mediations the judging word ascends towards a reunification of 
language and the world. Created language, in lieu of inherited language, is the condition of 
judgement’s possibility. Benjamin maintains that speaking subjects do not speak through 
language, but rather always in language4. As post-structuralism will later emphasize, language 
is always already given. The other of language, not the subject, is that which speaks in the 
spoken word; In underscoring the exceptionality of Kant’s capacity to create language, 
Benjamin suggests that Kant somehow breaks with a tradition of inheriting language, of 
philosophical terminologies that arise from their time and place. Instead, the Kantian 
philosophy is announced in a terminological system which is purely created. The demands of 
a justified knowledge are such that created language is its condition of possibility. Benjamin 
continues in the opening to his essay on the coming philosophy to suggest that Kant and
4 Benjamin writes “[w]hat does language communicate? It communicates the mental [spiritual] being 
corresponding to it. It is fundamental that this mental being communicates itself in language and not 
through language. Languages, therefore, have no speaker, if  this means someone who communicates 
through these languages” (SW 1,63)
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Plato are guided by the “confidence that the knowledge of which we can give the clearest 
account will also be the most profound” (SW1, 100). This translates into Benjamin’s 
prediction that “[t]he more unpredictably and boldly the development of future philosophy 
announces itself, the more deeply it must struggle for certainty, whose criterion Is systematic 
unity or truth” (SW1, 100). ■;
As suggested above, the structure of Kant’s critical philosophy is such that it 
presents its findings as self-evident. The Kantian program is so thorough and rigorous in the 
form of its knowledge that it finds nothing in experience that is incompatible with its own 
rationality. What then, we might ask, might have arisen so as to call into question the present 
form of the Kantian system? In other words, Benjamin’s call, in his letter to Scholem, to 
‘universalize’ and ‘set in granite’ the Kantian system entails that there is something which 
somehow stands between the Kantian system and its universalization. This something is 
postulated by Benjamin in “On the Coming Philosophy” as new forms of experience, not 
only in the present or future, but also in the historically intuited past. To this end Benjamin 
writes that “the most important obstacle to linking a truly time- and eternity-conscious 
philosophy to Kant is the following: The reality with which, and with the knowledge of 
which, Kant wanted to base knowledge on certainty and truth is a reality of a low, perhaps 
the lowest order” (SW1, 100). The form of all worldviews, according to Benjamin, is that 
their experience is always “unique and temporally limited” (SW 1,101). Kant’s deficiency and 
hence what must be remedied in the philosophy of the future is his generalization of 
Enlightenment experience to all experience. According to Benjamin “Kant wanted to take 
the principles of experience [as such] from the sciences—in particular mathematical physics” 
yet “experience itself and unto itse lf was never identical with the object realm of that 
science” (SW 1,101). Kant’s critical philosophy andits devaluation of experience to a field of
>
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mechanical interactions is the consequence of a particular moment in which the authorities 
or intellects who might “have managed to give a higher context to experience” through 
religion or art, were marginal. Consequently, Kant and the lesser Enlightenment thinkers 
developed a philosophy adequate maybe to their time, but ultimately insufficient in relation 
to a philosophy of the future. , Kant provides a valid explanation or: framework for 
“knowledge that is lasting” while neglecting “the question of the integrity of an experience 
that is ephemeral” (SW1, 100).
Benjamin proceeds in “On the Coming Philosophy” to articulate a number of sites 
where the tension between Kant’s abilities as a conceptual thinker come into unsustainable 
tension with his neglect of the question of time and transience. This tension is manifest in 
Kant’s mistaken generalization of the reality or world view' of the Enlightenment onto 
experience and knowledge as such. Benjamin identifies two principal sites of mistaken 
generalization, namely Kant’s conception of knowledge as that which arises from relations 
between subjects and objects and Kant’s “relation.of knowledge and experience to human 
empirical consciousness” (SW1, 103). On Benjamin’s first emphasis, object-subject 
interactionism is an image in thought which underpins the totality of Kant’s Critique o f  Pure 
Reason. The existence of subjects and objects is the ground of Kant’s “Copemican 
Revolution.” According; to Kant, the tradition of philosophy before him mistakenly 
attempted to draw necessity from, investigations into the objects of experience. The 
“Copemican Revolution” breaks with the tradition by investigating the cognizing subject. Yet 
nowhere in the revolutionary turn is the basis of these two distinct ontological categories 
adequately investigated. Benjamin emphasizes that the whole approach is couched within the 
conventions of a particular place and time. Thus Kantian subject is formed out of an 
analogy, according to Benjamin, with the empirical models of consciousness prevalent in
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pre-Kantian English philosophy. Kant’s rigorous purification of the trappings of 
metaphysics in philosophy succumbs to an unrecognized metaphysical presupposition from 
which his understanding of finitude and limitation ultimately result. Benjamin writes that “[i]t 
simply cannot be doubted that the notion, sublimated though it may be, of an individual 
living ego which receives sensations by means of its sense and forms its ideas on the basis of 
them plays a role o f , the greatest importance in the Kantian concept of knowledge” (SW1, 
103). The whole conceptual apparatus of the Kantian critical system rests on an implicit 
metaphysical or, as Benjamin goes as far as to say, mythological structure. Without the 
rigorous mythological distinction between the domains of knowledge which are proper to 
objects and empirically affected subjects, Kant cannot determine the distributions of 
necessity across the structures of reception characteristic of the empirically effected subject. 
Benjamin elaborates that the implicit myth of an “individual living ego which receives 
sensations” has no more claim to a transcendental account of experience as such than the 
accounts of “clairvoyants who at least claim to be able to fee! the sensations of others as 
their own” or else “insane people who likewise identify themselves in part with objects of 
their perception” .(SW1, 103). When viewed from the perspective of a deep historical time, 
each species of distribution of the concèpts of subject and object—be it clairvoyant, insane, 
or Enlightened—is seen to arises in the course of “ephemeral experience.” Consequently, as 
Benjamin writes, “Kantian ‘experience’ is metaphysics or mythology, and indeed only a 
modem and religiously very infertile one” (SW1, 103).
Benjamin’s short hand assertion of the historically limited ground which sustains the 
Kantian concept of experience demands reconciliation with his high praises of the virtues 
of the Kantian system at the outset of his essay “On the Coming Philosophy.” If the clarity 
and justification of a philosophical program are virtues, then their possibility over and above
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the trappings of ephemeral experience are implied as possibilities. The route to this 
reconciliation and the development of clarity and justification in a work of philosophy is
i
borne out of the other principal objection Benjamin brings to the Kantian critical project, 
namely Kant’s manner of determining the “relation of knowledge and experience to human 
empirical consciousness” (SW1, 103). According to Benjamin, Kant falls short of the 
demands of a true unified system of knowledge by equivocating knowledge-as-such and 
experience-as-such with an instance of human empirical consciousness. Kant fails to take 
account of the historical in his categorical system. In overlooking the contingency which 
foregrounds any empirical consciousness, Kant mistakenly generalizes the particular content 
of Enlightenment empirical experience into a transcendental consciousness. Benjamin seeks 
to preserve the project of determining a transcendental consciousness, but for him this 
entails an extensive revision of the relation of knowledge and experience to the empirical.
Benjamin’s revision can be understood in terms of his grounding assumption that 
“[pjhilosophy is based upon the fact that the structure of experience lies within the structure 
of knowledge and is to be developed from it” (SW 1,104). The answer to the problem which 
is generated by the myriad moments of ‘ephemeral experience’ is an assertion of the 
fundamental necessity of speculative philosophy. Speculative philosophy seeks to gives an 
adequate account of the diversity of experience latent in the present and pregnant in the 
‘great future’. Benjamin’s speculative philosophy is tasked with the qualification that it must 
contain the clarity and justification of the Kantian system, while somehow giving an 
adequate account of all possible instances of the empirical consciousness. Benjamin writes 
that “the task of the coming philosophy can be conceived as the discovery or creation of 
that concept of knowledge which, by relating experience exclusively to the transcendental 
consciousness, makes not only mechanical but also religious experience logically possible”
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(swi, 105). . , ■
Situated within these requirements, the paradoxical task of any speculative system 
presents itself. Although the speculative system takes the concept of pure knowledge as its 
ground, its justification is its ability to give an account of all possible experience. Thus 
echoing the opening lines of Kant’s second introduction to the Critique o f  Pure Reason5, 
Benjamin affirms that “the conditions of knowledge are those of experience” (SWI, 104). 
‘Real knowledge’ somehow, stands outside of empirical experience, while taking said 
experience as its condition of possibility. Benjamin departs from Kant insofar as Kant 
arrests the ephemeral flux of experience which underpins the moments of the empirical 
consciousness and forms a system of knowledge in the image of this instance of historically 
determined experience, while Benjamin is faithful to the claim of the ephemeral. ‘Real 
knowledge’ arises: out of the insight into the contingent moments of its generative 
experiences. Benjamin writes
Corresponding to the types of empirical consciousness are just as many 
types of experiences,, which in regard to their relation to the empirical 
consciousness, so far as truth is concerned, have the value only of fantasy 
, and hallucination. For an objective relation between the empirical 
consciousness and the objective concept of experience is impossible. A ll ' 
genuine experience rests upon the pure “epistemological (transcendental) 
consciousness,” if  this term is still usable under the condition that it be 
stripped of everything subjective. (SWI, 104)
“Objective experience” functions in Benjamin’s essay to designate that which stands above
the moments of empirical consciousness. Echoing neo-Kantian enthusiasms for the notion
of the ‘limit concept’ (MR, 27), or else the Kantian noumenon, “objective experience”
functions within the totality of Benjamin’s system to designate the non-given locus around
which every instance of empirical experience circulates—the total domain in which that
which presents itself in dreams, in the moments of history and in diverse spaces and times
5 Kant writes that “[t]here is no doubt whatever that all our cognition begins with experience” (CPR, Bl)
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attains its formless form. ‘Real knowledge/ the knowledge proper to the transcendental 
consciousness, is the system of knowledge that is adequate to the apprehension of this 
domain. ;
“On the Program of the Coming Philosophy” does not go so far as to concretely 
describe the “epistemological / transcendental consciousness” that is adequate to knowledge 
of objective experience, but Benjamin supplies certain indications of its basic constitution. 
Benjamin suggests that the philosophy of the future is obligated to “find for knowledge the 
sphere of total neutrality in regard to the concepts of both subject and object” (SW1, 104). 
Benjamin continues to specify that this means “to discover the autonomous, innate sphere of 
knowledge in which this concept [knowledge] in no way continues to designate the relation 
between two metaphysical entities” (SW1, 104). The transcendental consciousness which is 
proper to the speculative philosophy of the future not only ostensibly neutralizes notions of 
subjectivity and objectivity, but goes so far as to eliminate any metaphysical mediation which 
in any way recapitulates their opposition. The philosophy of the future demands a 
neutralization that seems to be beyond thought, a neutralization which Benjamin refrains 
from formulating. The philosophy of the future does not so much herald an 
accomplishment in the present as it signals a lack which might only find its resolution in the 
to-come. The philosophy of the future w ill somehow embody the clarity and justification of 
the Kantian system, while addressing a concept of experience unfolded to encompass the 
totality of its individual moments. Further, it w ill transcend the figures of the subject and the 
object. But what is left after the subject? How is the structure of the Kantian critical 
philosophy compatible with a consciousness that is “stripped of everything subjective?” Is 
this figure human or godly?
Jumping ahead to Benjamin’s “Theses on the Concept of History,” the import of
Benjamin’s call for th e ‘neutralization5 of the concepts of subject and object attains clarity in 
the third thesis. Benjamin writes that “only a redeemed mankind is granted the fullness of its 
past—which is to say, only for a redeemed mankind has its past become citable in all its 
moments. Each moment it has lived becomes  ̂ citation a Vordre du jo u r . And that day is 
judgement day” (SW4, 390). Mankind is not yet redeemed, either in 1918 or at any other 
time. The redemption is futural. But the futural redemption does not merely signal the 
coming of God. The fragment is dialectical insofar as it unites sacred and profane images of 
the citation and recapitulation of all that has passed. The day of divine judgement recalls all
of history to the present, while the citation a Vordre du jo u r  evokes the (French) military
\
practice of taking precise account o f the actions of the day. Both role-calls present a figure 
which somehow fulfils the task of the ‘empirical/transcendental7 consciousness5 intimated in 
“On the Coming Philosophy,55 namely to apprehend ‘objective experience5 through the 
moments of ‘ephemeral experience.5 The army officer who draws the list of the no doubt 
diverse experience of the day is a figure of finitude, while God, a figure of infinity. The 
redemption of mankind for Benjamin is lodged between these constitutions. The 
development of this thought, namely the task of the coming philosophy within the tension 
of finitude and infinity, finds some of its clearest articulation in Benjamin’s 1916 essay “On 
Language as Such and on the Language of Man.55
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1.5 On Language as a  G round of the Speculative Philosophy of the Future
Benjamin’s 1916 essay “On Language As Such and on the Language of Man” represents, in 
the opinion of many commentators, Benjamin’s first attempt to articulate a speculative 
philosophy. . The work ostensibly presents an account of language, but a highly idiosyncratic
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one at that. It should be said at the outset that Benjamin’s injunction to 'neutralize’ the 
concepts of subject and object in the development of a transcendental consciousness 
adequate to the philosophy of the future attains at least a preliminary extension in “On 
Language” to the sphere of language, a sphere which by common accounts is treated through 
the lens of subjectivity.
This common account, which views language through the lens of subjectivity, bears 
unmistakable affinities with the manner of doing philosophy Benjamin sets himself against in 
“On the Coming Philosophy.” Benjamin characterizes the commonplace antagonist of his 
linguistic project at the outset of his essay when he writes that according to the Bourgeois 
conception of language “the means of communication is the word, its object factual, and its 
addressee a human being” (SW 1,'65). According to Bourgeois conceptions of language, 
language is commensurate with vocal or symbolic expressions between human subjects who 
instrumentalize language to designate factual objects in the world. According to this logic not 
only do subjects exist, but by consequence objects—in their subordinated self-evidence-—are 
available for designation. The Bourgeois conception; of language is predicated on the 
assumption of a factual availability of objects in the world. These are the objects taken up in 
language and there is no mystery to them. Language is a veneer through which the world as it 
is demonstrably ordered is related between subjects. Yet for Benjamin, every presumption 
that the materiality of experience is factually available is inherently suspect. Echoing his 
critique of Kant’s tendency to neglect 'ephemeral experience’ and to take the “unique and 
temporally limited” experience of a moment as the all, the Bourgeois conception of language 
is simply a reifying sleight of hand. Not only do its presuppositions rob the mediation of 
materiality of any historical awareness, they also conceal their latent metaphysical 
presuppositions.
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Consequently, Benjamin’s task in “On Language” is to present a genesis of language 
which does not fall prey to these reifying tendencies. This presentation develops a 
systematically structured perspective that can only be taken to be the beginnings of the 
‘transcendental consciousness’ suggested in “On the Coming Philosophy.” Peter Fenves, in 
his recent commentary on Benjamin entided The Messianic Réduction, suggests the enormity of 
Benjamin’s gesture in “On Language,” and its commensurability with this characterization
when he writes that “Benjamin’s argument for the applicability of the term language beyond
(
the conscious subject is modelled on Kant’s argument for space and time as pure intuitions” 
(MR, 137). While it suffers in translation, Fenves compellingly argues that Benjamin’s
attempt to define language as such, namely Sprache iiberhaupt, is to be read in analogy with
//
Kant’s term for consciousness in general, namely Bewussfein iiberhaupt, According to 
Benjamin, “On Language” attempts to develop a “purified concept of language” (SW1, 74) 
through reckoning with the diverse field of its expressions, both in cultural and theological 
history. The purification of Sprache iiberhaupt reprises Benjamin’s injunction in “On the
Coming Philosophy” to attain a purified concept of the “empirical / transcendental
. \
consciousness.” This connection is further concretized in “On the Coming Philosophy” 
when Benjamin writes.that “[a] concept of knowledge gained from reflection on the linguistic 
nature of knowledge will create a corresponding concept of experience which w ill also 
encompass realms that Kant failed to truly systematize” (SW1, 108). Sprache uberhaupt 
presents a means of exploring the'constitution of experience and knowledge that is not 
strictly beholden to the domains of subject and object. Likewise, it presents a means of 
accounting for the diversity o f‘ephemeral experience’ in its formulation of the genesis of the 
‘language of man’ out of the fall from paradise. 6
6 See Fenves (MR, 155)
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Benjamin begins to unfold his conception of language—a language beyond subjects
and objects—through a familiar cultural idiom, namely the fact that ‘‘[i]t is possible to talk
about a language of music and of sculpture.” Each of these spheres, which are often
colloquially understood as languages, can be understood as the results of a tendency
“inherent in the subjects concerned—technology, art, justice, or religion—toward the
communication of the contents of the mind [spirit]”7 (SW1, 62). Art and music function in
the beginning of “On Language” to demonstrate the existence of spheres of
expression/language, which are not reducible to a designative utility. Instead, they speak
from some latent content of spirit that expresses itself in the world. The languages of music
and art stand in marked opposition to the Bourgeois conception of language, insofar as they
present an opening to spirit which has no concrete correlate'"^in the ‘world of objects’.
Communication in words, according to Benjamin, is “only a particular case of human
language” (SW1, 62). Other cases of human language, such as sculpture or music, demand to
be encompassed by the concept of language.
Having begun to sketch his eventual thesis that “all expression, insofar as it is a
communication of contents of the mind [spirit], is to be classified as language” (SW1, 62)
Benjamin’s next step is to integrate the scope of all that ‘expresses’ into his conceptual
structure. Since the essay on language is intent on ‘neutralizing’ notions of subjects and
objects, Benjamin concludes that all expression in the world, whether unfolding from within
the scope of human expression or the expression of things and events va the world, expresses
in language. Benjamin writes that the existence of language
is coextensive not only with all the areas of human mental [spiritual] 
expression in which language is always in one sense or another inherent, but
7 It should be noted here that Geist is rendered in the Harvard edition o f Benjamin's selected works as 
Mind, whereas other translations privilege the translation as Spirit. Benjamin's original expression is 
geistiger Inhalte (CE, 15).
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with absolutely everything. There is no event or thing in either animate or 
inanimate nature that does not in some way partake of language, for it is in 
the nature of each one to communicate its mental [spiritual] contents.
(SW1, 62)
Benjamin's pursuit of Sprache uberhaupt requires an expansion of the concept of language to 
the totality o f ‘events' and ‘things' in the world. Benjamin contends that things in the world, 
such as lamps or trees, in expressing their spiritual contents, convey a mute language that is 
akin to the mute language of arts such as painting or sculpture. This is not to say that the 
‘being’ of what is in the world is fully expressed in every moment of its expression. For 
Benjamin there is a constitutive gap between the mental/spiritual entity that is the condition 
of possibility of expression and its expression itself. Benjamin writes that “[t]he language of 
this lamp, for example, communicates not the lamp (for the^mental being of the lamp, 
insofar as it is communicable, is by no means the lamp itself) but the language-lamp, the lamp in 
communication, the lamp in expression” (SW1, 63). Benjamin’s qualification of the 
constitutive gap between ‘being’ or ‘mental / spiritual contents’ and expression is a necessary 
qualification in light of his rejection of Bourgeois conceptions of the demonstrative function 
of language. Were things, arts and events to present their full inner life in expression there 
would be no time or history. Benjamin’s distinction between ‘objective experience’ and 
‘empirical experience’ in “On the Coming Philosophy” is established out of the same 
tension. An ‘objective experience’ of entities in*the world might be available for the 
redeemed philosophy of the future, but it is not for us.
Benjamin’s distinction generates a preliminary ontology. He writes that “the language 
of a mental [spiritual] entity is directly that which is communicable in it” and that “[t]he 
linguistic being of things is their language” (SW1, 64). Instead of affirming that the being of 
an entity is expressed through language—i.e. the lamp communicates its being through 
language—Benjamin posits that it is the linguistic being, and linguistic being alone, of a thing
36
that communicates itself. Consequently the expressive language of a thing cannot be 
“externally limited or measured” by relation to whatever ‘unexpressed5 remainder there is in 
the being of a thing. Being and linguistic being constitute two distinct ontological domains, 
at least with respect to things.
Having established a general framework of the existence of language in all entities in 
the world, Benjamin goes on to distinguish between three varieties of language, namely the 
language of things, the language of man and the language of God. Benjamin begins with the 
distinction between the ‘language of man5 and the ‘language of things5. He writes that, like 
animate and inanimate entities in the world, “the linguistic being of man is his language.55 Yet 
this is qualified by a further distinction which generates the exceptional structure of human
j
linguistic being, namely that “the language of man speaks1 in words55 and that “[m]an 
therefore communicates his own mental [spiritual] being (insofar as it is communicable) by 
naming all other things55 (SW1, 64). In distinction from the languages of things, which are 
radiating sites of pure expression of their linguistic being, the expression of man is naming 
and consequently knowing. In the midst of a world of expressing things, man expresses in 
the speaking of words and the giving of names to the objects of the world which announce 
themselves in their languages. Benjamin writes that “[o]nly through the linguistic being of 
things can he [man] get beyond himself and attain knowledge of them—in the name. Gods 
creation is completed when things receive their names from man, from whom in name 
language alone speaks55 (SW1, 65).
Yet God5s creation is not fulfilled in the simple act of naming, because the languages 
of man are as diverse as the languages of things. Benjamin writes that “[w]ithin all linguistic 
formation a conflict is waged between what is expressed and expressible and what is 
inexpressible and unexpressed.” (SW1, 66). Recalling “On the Coming Philosophy,” the
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structures of linguistic being which correspond to the ‘objective experience’ of the being of 
things are “unique and temporally limited’’ in their manifestations. It is only in moments of 
revelation that the names of man are adequate to their objects. Benjamin writes that “[t]he 
highest mental region of religion is (in the concept of revelation) at the same time the only 
one that does not know the inexpressible” (SW1, 67). Revelation is the unique moment in 
which the naming language of man attains its complete commensurability with not only the 
particular linguistic being of things but also the being of things themselves.
Benjamin’s characterization of the structure of the language of man, in both its 
naming function, and its imperfection, is derived from his analysis of the language of God 
and the biblical story of creation. It should be noted that within the theological context 
Benjamin develops in “On Language” all of the above characterizations of the language of 
man apply only to postlapsarian human language. The middle section of Benjamin’s curious 
essay is devoted to a linguistically attentive exegesis of Genesis, through which he develops a 
characterization of the language of God, prelapsarian human language, and the fall into the 
poastlapsarian condition.
Benjamin begins to develop an image of the language of God through an articulation 
of the rhythms of the act of creation in the first chapter of Genesis. According to Benjamin 
“the rhythm by which the creation of nature (in Genesis 1) is accomplished is: Let there be— 
He made (created)—He named” (SW1, 68). In the rhythm of biblical creation the word o f  God\ 
the “Let there be,” is the seed of the creation' of the world. “In individual acts of creation [in 
Genesis] (Genesis 1:3 and 1:11) only the words “Let there be” occur” (SW1, 68). In speaking 
the word, according to Benjamin, God creates. But beyond the pure creative divine word, 
God’s language is the original source of the name. In announcing at the end of creation that 
“he saw that it [creation] was good” God’s language steps back from the immediacy of the
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creative act and takes on the function, of cognizing. Naming ¡the world in its goodness 
extends language beyond its creative immediacy to a universal cognition which is the divine 
origin of knowledge. Benjamin suggests that “[ljanguage is therefore both creative and the 
finished creation; it is word and name. In God, name is creative because it is word, and 
God’s word is cognizant because it is name” (SW1, 68). The very fact of God’s capacity to 
see that creation is good implies, according to Benjamin, that “God made things knowable in 
their names” (SW1, 68). :/
In accounting for; the genesis of man Benjamin is careful to maintain that in 
distinction from the remainder of creation “God did not create man from the word, and he 
did not name him” (SW1, 68). Instead, the second story of creation stipulates that man was 
made from earth, inflected with the breath of God. Fenves emphasizes this connection in the 
MessianicReduction by citing the biblical words for earth (adamah) and blood (dam) (MR, 143). 
Man is formed out o f the pre-existing material of creation and thus he is accorded an 
exceptionality among all other creation. The first man is, according to Benjamin, not sub-ject 
to language like the other objects of creation, but stands above them with the power to name 
m the likeness of God. However, the nominative capacity of the language of man is 
categorically different from that of God insofar as the names man speaks are spoken onto the 
world. The language of God speaks into the uncreated and thereafter there is world, whereas 
man finds himself always already in creation. Like the cognitive/creative word/name of the 
language of God, human language creates and cognizes. But the creative structure o f human 
language is of a different order of magnitude than that of God. God’s creation is pure, while 
man’s creation is the creation of knowledge and name for that which materially already is, 
such as the plants and the animals. This distinction is concretized through Benjamin’s
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announcement that “[m]an is the knower in the same language in which God is the creator” 
(SW1, 68).
The condition of the original language, Adam’s language in prelapsarian paradise, is 
one of perfect commensurability with the things of creation. While man is distinguished 
from God through his diminished creative power, he is like God in the perfect adequacy of 
his names to creation—he completes God’s creation in the complete attribution of names to 
the world. Each animal steps forward to Adam and receives its perfect name.-But paradise is 
lost, and in its loss the infinite, multiple languages of the postlapsarian world take the place 
of the perfect language. Benjamin writes that the “paradisical language of man must have
been one of perfect knowledge, whereas later all knowledge is again infinitely differentiated
/
in the multiplicity of language” (SW1, 71). ..' f7 ;
The fall, the condition of all human language to follow, comes about according to 
Benjamin through the introduction of false names to paradise through the tree of knowledge. 
The tree of knowledge presents knowledge of ‘good’ and ‘evil’. But in light of the final day of 
creation, when God nominated all of creation as good, it is clear that the nominative categoiy 
of evil is an excessive supplement to a world that has already been named. Consequently, as 
Benjamin writes “[n]ame steps outside itself in this knowledge [of good and evil]: the Fall 
marks the birth of the human word, in which name no longer fives intact and which has 
stepped out of name-language” (SW 1,71). In attempting to reconcile excess, the name ‘evil,’ 
with a creation which has already been exhaustively nominated as good, language is 
corrupted and its immediate correspondence to creation is ruptured. Benjamin maintains that 
“[knowledge of good and evil abandons name; it is a knowledge from outside, the uncreated 
imitation of the creative word” (SW1, 71). In the introduction of false language to the world
the language of man becomes a mediate parody of its once immediate expression and 
cognition. ; ; ' . <...
The fall of man has three linguistic consequences for Benjamin, namely the 
proliferation of languages, the advent of judgement and the advent of abstraction. In the 
introduction of the false name of evil the immediate correspondence of names to their 
objects is broken. Consequently, human language proliferates in abortive attempts to 
recapture the pure immediacy of the paradisical language. Postlapsarian language circulates 
indefinitely around its barred signified. In the field of these wild proliferations judgement 
arises as the means by which languages are evaluated and compared. Benjamin maintains that 
“[i]n the Fall, since the eternal purity of names was violated, the sterner purity of the judging 
word arose” (SW1, 71). Judgement, which is both the exercise of the judging human and the 
judgement of God, presents the magical potential for a redemption of the languages of men. 
Recalling Benjamin’s third thesis on history, Judgement day is that time in which mankind is 
redeemed and the past becomes citable in all of its moments. In the dialectical image of the 
human citation a Vordre du jo u r  and the divine day of judgement the transubjective quality 
judgement presents itself. The ideal end of judgement is the reconciliation of all the unique 
and temporally limited moments of the language of man.
Benjamin’s theory of postlapsarian language is not content with a transformed image 
of the adequacy of human language to the world of things. The transition from the ‘blissful’ 
prelapsarian paradise into the postlapsarian world is connected with a ‘silencing’ of the 
language of things. Benjamin suggests that the postlapsarian condition of human language 
results in an “over-naming” of things. The multiplicity of postlapsarian languages strive to 
capture the latent spiritual /mental content of the things of the world but cannot through 




silence. He writes that “[bjecause she is mute, nature mourns” and because of her sadness, 
nature is mute. “In mourning there is the deepest inclination to speechlessness, which is 
infinitely more than the inability or disinclination to communicate” (SW 1,73). The mourning 
of nature for her lost relationship to humanity is generative of a silence that is the only space 
in which she can maintain her decency.
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Chapter 2: The Circulation o f the languages o f  Humanity
2.1 Baudelaire, Benjamin and Surrealism
Benjamin’s early theoretical writings provide a robust conceptual structure through which the 
present is revealed in its contingency. Throughout these writings a potential vantage or
consciousness is explicitly posited in which knowledge would efface its contingency and 
become fundamentally transcendental, in which names might be restored to their pure 
adequacy to the things of experience8. Benjamin’s “On the Coming Philosophy” situates the
moment of the redemption of knowledge and philosophy in a^future which is yet to come 
while “On Language as Such” situates the point of transcendental knowledge, or pure name, 
in a prelapsarian past. In either case, the present is defined by its fallen systems of knowledge 
that mistakenly generalize their image of experience onto experience-as-such, or else 
mistakenly persist in their contingent iteration of human language. Both characterizations 
suggest circulations of knowledge and language that attempt to attain adequacy with the 
things to which they refer, but are nonetheless barred from the paradisiacal knowledge of 
‘objective experience’ or the purified name. Benjamin’s attempt to reconcile the justification
It is worth noting where Benjamin falls within the ErlebnisfErfahrung debate which 
characterized much o f  early twentieth century German philosophy. Peter Fenves maintains that Benjamin’s 
position falls somewhere between the two accounts. According to Fenves, Benjamin affirms the “pathos o f  
the contemporary Erlebnis discourse, which summarily repudiates the “mechanical-mathematical” 
experience o f  the physical sciences; but he does not then expand this pathos in evocation o f the higher life 
that awaits whomever has enough courage to beak out o f  the narrow confines o f  Kantian critique in 
particular and Western-rationalism in general” (MR, 156). In short, Benjamin attempted to affirm the 
consistency and determinability o f  experience characteristic o f  Erfahrung discourse, but only once it had 
been purified o f  its assumptions regarding subject-object causation. Martin Buber’s mystical affirmation o f  
lived experience, or Wilhelm Dilthey’s psychologism appealed to Benjamin in their exploration o f  territories 
o f knowledge outside o f  the Enlightenment model, but provided no means o f  reconciling the demands o f  
the reformulated Kantian system. Fenves suggests that Benjamin’s oeuvre can be interpreted as a 
development o f  the phenomenological natural reduction towards a ‘messianic reduction.’ Experience 
remains hypothetically determinable, but phenomenology’s reduction fails to sufficiently ‘neutralize’ its 
implicit subject-object distinctions.
and clarity of the Kantian program with ephemeral experience yields a preliminary- 
speculative ontology of language and representation which accounts for the history, of 
culture and its reflections through the clarification of a theologically structured constitutive 
gap between names and things. Benjamin’s development of the Kantian program produces a 
theoretical structure that is kindred with Kant in its self-consistency, but departs from Kant 
in the fundamental openness of his through to the possibility of experiences, which are to 
come. Consequently, Benjamin’s thought, as yet another moment of the proliferation of the 
languages of man, does not profess to stand in as the redemptive culmination of knowledge 
and human language. The early essays are no fait-accompli but rather a gesture toward the 
necessary form of redeemed knowledge. The question for Benjamin in the 1920s and 1930s
j
is one of actualizing and politicizing the results of his early research.
The principal object of this chapter is to develop the assertion that Benjamin 
attempts to produce a political and practical orientation for his theories of language and the 
coming philosophy through his investigation of surrealist literary experimentation and the 
appropriation of its techniques into his later ‘historical materialist’ project. Benjamin’s work 
with and out of the surrealists develops methods of bringing the ‘things of the world’ from 
their silence through the development of concrete experiential records. A theoretical 
program, such as that of the surrealists, which is predicated on the development of literary 
traces of singular encounters with the things of the world is closely aligned with Benjamin’s 
early aims. The technological distribution of surrealist insights through avenues of 
publication and forms of mass art presents the means of politicizing these investigations. 
This connection is attested to in numerous places throughout Benjamin’s writings, such as in 
his 1929 essay “Surrealism; The Last Snapshot o f  the European Intelligentsia,” w h e r e  he 
emphasizes surrealism’s capacity to push “the ‘poetic life’ to the utmost limits of possibility”
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and to bring their theoretical knowledge into concrete lived expression (SW2.1, 208). 
Benjamin suggests that “it is as magical experiments with words, not as artistic dabbling, that 
we must understand the passionate phonetic and graphic transformational games that have 
run through the whole literature of the avant-garde for the past fifteen years, whether it is 
called Futurism, Dadaism, or Surrealism” (SW 2.1, 212) The surrealists present a 
development of Benjamin’s own early theories of language. They give magic to words, and 
explore the pliable sphère of the naming of things. This is why Benjamin writes in 1927, two 
years before the publication of “Surrealism,” that “whereas in Germany I feel entirely 
isolated among the men of my generation, there are isolated presences is France—-especially 
Aragon and the surrealist movement-—in which I see things at work that concern me” (FSR, 
29). ' ' • ■ ■ •"
At the outset of this investigation it is important to maintain that Benjamin’s early 
theories of language and knowledge are not simply concerned with the configuration of a 
moment of redemption. While a pure “transcendental / epistemological consciousness” or a 
restoration of the prelapsarian felicity of the languages of humanity might be the ultimate 
orientation of his theory, there is a preliminary obstacle for the coming philosophy, namely 
the task of recognizing the multiplicity of existent language, of bringing the consequences 
of the ephemerality of experience into sharp distinction. This task is threatened by the fact 
that particular ‘languages of humanity’ in the form of social ideology, are generalized to the 
point of excluding the recognition of their historicaT contingency. Kant’s system of 
philosophy reifies the Enlightenment empirical : consciousness into the figure of 
consciousness as such. Modernity presents a language for cognizing the things of the world 
that reduces them to exchange value. Before the question of the redemption of the 
languages of humanity can be posed, the contingency of the moments of language must be
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developed to the point of its recognition. While the myriad languages of humanity might be 
inadequate to the things of the world, the task of reconciling them is only possible through 
the recognition of their singular diversity.
. When the surrealists bring the things of the world to singular moments of speech, 
they are implicitly developing enunciations that are fundamentally incompatible with the 
stifling languages of their early twentieth century moment. Benjamin’s encounter with the 
surrealists represents the beginnings of the politicization of his early theory of language. 
Benjamin’s alignment with surrealism broadens his theory of language, which is abstract in 
its prescriptions, into a program for socially distributing fragmentary insights into the nature 
of language and history. This socially distributed theoretical/literary program contains the
j
power to, if  not redeem the ‘languages of men’, at least occasion the recognition of the task 
of their redemption.
I w ill begin the development of this argument by elaborating the aesthetic theory of 
Charles Baudelaire, a fundamental influence of surrealism in the 1920s, and the object of a 
great deal of Benjamin’s mature work in the 1930s. In its explorations of fashion and beauty 
Baudelaire’s 1863 essay “The Painter of Modem Life” develops important affinities between 
the implicit structures of temporality and perception that foreground the projects of the 
surrealist and Benjamin. From there I w ill proceed to articulate the character of surrealist 
writing through a study of Aragon’s Paris Peasant, suggesting that surrealist theory, as a theory 
which seeks to infinitely transcend itself (PP, 195-196) utilizes accounts of experience in 
which the scope of a totality of expectations are ruptured to illustrate its logic. This is 
suggested in Aragon’s ‘corrective’ (PP, x) section of ParisP easanty namely “The Peasant’s 
Dream.” I w ill intersperse my analysis of these primary texts of surrealist theory with 
Benjamin’s own reflections on the movement, examining Benjamin’s emphases of certain
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stylistic approaches which figured prominently in both the writings of Baudelaire and the 
surrealists. From this I will develop the argument that many of Benjamin’s writings from the 
1930s, following his encounter with surrealism, recapitulate surrealist stylistic approaches to 
the question of the exposition of the fleeting and ephemeral. These stylistic considerations 
serve Benjamin and the-.'surrealists in their respective projects to develop both an 
understanding and redemption of modem-life, beyond the possibilities afforded by 
Baudelaire. Ultimately surrealism and Benjamin’s brand of historical materialism are 
encumbered by the burden of articulating a redemptive utopia that is not yet fully realized in 
the present. Their tasks entail a constant dialectical struggle between theory, which orients
investigation but also serves to close of the scope of what it admits, and those experience
/y .
which resist appropriation and symbolization, between conceptions of human agency and 
material experience from without.
2.2 On the Separation of Material and Image
Charles Baudelaire’s 1863 essay “The Painter of Modem Life’’ is widely considered the first 
major statement of the aesthetics of modernity. The work develops an account of the 
aesthetics of modernity through a careful reflection on Baudelaire’s contemporary, a 
lithographic artist named Monsieur G. According to Baudelaire, Monsieur G’s lithographs 
are exceptional in the history of French representative artwork insofar as they capture the 
fleeting gestures and accents that constitute modem fashion, in lieu of re-inscribing classical 
images of beauty onto the present. The ‘painter of modem life’ beaks with tradition insofar 
as he paints in a modem medium—the lithograph—and he paints a modem subject— 
namely modem Paris. The modem medium is exceptional for the breadth of representation
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i t  permits. Baudelaire’s artistic hero is reputed to work on hundreds of lithographs at a time. 
The lithograph is at once cheap to produce—and therefore free of the traditional trappings 
of the nineteenth century art-sponsorship—and quick to produce—enabling Monsieu G to 
work at a pace which is adequate to his fleeting object. The modem subject, Paris, is 
exceptional in the tempo of its transformations. The rapid expansion of the material base of 
production through the two major moments of the industrial revolution occasioned the rise 
of the first mass culture of conspicuous and ephemeral consumption in Paris. Industrial 
modernity produced volumes of fabric and completed garments which were unprecedented 
in all of history. For the first time an entire urban middle class could be clothed. Not only, 
could they be clothed, but with each passing season they could be clothed again and again9. 
The nineteenth century, as Ronald Schleifer makes clear in Modernism and Time: The Logic o f  
Abundance, a century of abundances, which make visible the ffacturous tempo of modem 
life. ■
f Baudelaire begins his essay “The Painter of Modem Life” with a curious example, 
namely a description of the way in which a modem Bourgeois subject—an allegory of 
Baudelaire’s contemporaries—engages . with the Louvre. According to Baudelaire, the 
Bourgeois subject in the famous art gallery attends only to the major works of art history: 
“the Davide’s” and “the Ingres.” The Bourgeois subject’s mistake is not his enjoyment of 
these major works, but rather his misplaced assumption that the history of these major works 
of art is commensurate with the history of art in general. Passing over the minor works 
collected in that space, the Bourgeois subjects neglect a vast history available to them. Their 
aesthetic practice is marred by their inability * to develop m odesof seeing which are 
commensurate with modernity. In isolating this bourgeois tendency, Baudelaire implicitly
9 See Ulrich Lehmann’s recent Tigersprung: Fashion in Modernity and Ronald Schleifer’s Modernism 
and Time: The Logic o f Abundance.
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suggests a need to recommit ourselves, culturally and individually, to the task of uncovering
the artistic'and historical value of the newly emerged staggering array of minor works of art.
An aesthetic practice, which is commensurate with the conditions of modernity is
exemplified in the first pages of “The Painter of Modem Life” where Baudelaire presents an
image of himself in his study, before a series of lithographs:
I have before me a series of fashion plates dating from the Revolution and finishing 
more or less with the Consulate. These costumes, which seem laughable to many 
thoughtless people—people who are grave without true gravity—have a double- 
natured charm, one both artistic and historical. They are often very beautiful and 
drawn with wit; but what to me is every bit as important, and what I am happy to 
find in all, or almost all of them, is the moral and aesthetic feeling of their time.
(PML, 2)
Baudelaire immediately notes that he is not looking into these plates for a superficial sense of 
their artistic charm—for some sense of nostalgia or kitsch. Rather, he is arrested by their 
individual testament to a specific feeling of beauty or morality, a feeling that is very much of 
their time. The lithograph, as Baudelaire’s commentary makes clear, is a technology of art 
that demands a reconstitution of our conventional modes of aesthetic appreciation. The 
lithograph, like the technologies of production in fashion, enables the coming in-to being of 
an object which in hindsight was There all along.’
This revelation is not without its problems and complications. Anyone who has, 
owing to an inclement schedule, attempted to engage with the contents of an entire art 
gallery in a single afternoon understands the exhaustion and the ultimate feeling of futility 
such overzealous projects are wont to evoke. Likewise, there is something endearingly futile 
in Baudelaire’s pose before his fashion plates. Sitting before the many traces of ephemeral, 
fugitive and contingent moral content contained in these plates, Baudelaire sits with a 
superhuman historical and aesthetic challenge. The obverse of Baudelaire’s attention to such
diverse and rich historical works is, ultimately, the extent to which historical knowledge 
remains hidden from him.
The practice of a seeing adequate to modernity demands a reformulation of the idea
of beauty. Baudelaire consolidates his injunction to attune the aesthetic gaze to artistic
technologies of the present and to its content when he writes:
Beauty is made up of an eternal, invariable element, whose quantity it is 
excessively difficult to determine, and a relative, circumstantial element, which 
will be, if  you like, whether severally or all at once, the age, its fashions, its 
morals, its emotions. Without this second element, which might be described 
as the amusing, enticing, appetizing icing on the divine cake, the first element 
would be beyond our powers of digestion or appreciation, neither adapted 
nor suitable to human nature. I defy anyone to point to a single scrap of 
beauty which does not contain these two elements. (PM, 3)
While this observation, that our capacity to engage with the eternal element of beauty is
always limited to the madly fluctuating aperture of a certain fleeting moment, appears
commonplace from a contemporary standpoint it resounds with consequence. Baudelaire,
whose life spanned the middle period of the nineteenth century, witnessed the boom of
speed and tempo of nineteenth century European fife. He stood at a particular crux, namely
that which bridged a pre-modem Europe fixated on ideas of permanence, God, and eternity,
and a modem, Hausemannized, secular Europe. Coupling these major social transformations
with the increasing tendency toward industrialization, speed, and mechanization, the
nineteenth century is the site of the simultaneous realization of the profound difference
between the not-long-ago and the present, and the ultimate openness of this very present, its
unfinished, ever operative Meeting’ and ‘ephemeral’ qualities.
By postulating that beauty assumes new definitions according to all of the
contingencies of fashions and of times, Baudelaire challenges the assumption that the
materiality that underlies our experience is knowable. In place of such conceptions,
Baudelaire’s assertion entails the conclusion that an understanding of material culture is
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always mediated by the circumstantial contingencies of knowing—ie. the time and place that 
structure a particular idea of beauty. In other words, the knowledge of a particular piece of 
materiality is neither direcdy cognized, nor is it simply cognized according to a 
transcendental-idealist structure of cognition. Recalling Benjamin’s formulations in his eady 
essays, modernity is comprised of an ever-accelerating proliferation of the languages of 
humanity. The Bourgeois subject lacks the capacity to perceive the rate of proliferation of 
modem languages and instead consolidates them in an outmoded understanding of the grand 
narrative of art history. The Bourgeois subject does not perceive the “relative, circumstantial 
element” of beauty, but yokes beauty to an eternal and timeless model. Modernity makes 
visible a new structure of temporality. The task of the revolutionary in the present is to bring 
these energies into visibility. x
Baudelaire's insight has the implicit function of imbuing the underlying material of 
experience—this dress, this table, these people—with profound mystery and profound 
potentiality. As we cleave cognition from material, the world around us, which appears so 
definite and unalterable, assumes an unsettling air of contingency. For instance, there is a 
plain table in my room that rests comfortably among the chairs and on the carpet. Its 
appearance has the air of permanence and necessity. Yet, for the carpenter who built it, this 
table may very well radiate his livelihood, or reflect back to him the secret struggles of a 
lifetime of craft. For my father, who gave it to me several years ago, this table might appear 
as the site where his long-dissolved family once gathered to eat together. His object-image is 
laden with sentiment and absence. And modem consumerism, though its allegorical 
understanding of material culture, might encourage the formation of an object-image of the 
table that is reduced to exchange value. In all of these examples the materiality of the table 
persists, but it is taken up into different cognitions.
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2.3 o n  the Pa r a d o x e s  o f  the Split
Baudelaire’s “The Painter of Modem Life” is valuable insofar as it raises the question of the 
new aesthetics of modem life, but it falls short of an ethics in its vague prescriptions 
concerning the invention or development of a way of seeing which is adequate to modernity. 
Baudelaire’s articulation of the Bourgeois experience of the Louvre suggests that the 
Bourgeois subject is not shaken from his manner of seeing simply in confronting the diverse 
arts of modernity. The Bourgeois subject confronts the new art with a laugh, and a sensibility 
which is “grave without gravity.” The pohticization of Baudelaire’s insight into the character 
and the art-work of modernity demands the extension of the insight to socially transmissible
.. . . . . . .  ,J ' . „ ■ - -  ■ X
forms.
Stated briefly, the ethical question which results from Baudelaire is that if  material 
culture can be taken up into different object-images, which might preserve the singularity of 
modem experience in the case of the myriad lithographs of Monsieur G., or else repress the 
proliferation of singularity in the case of a Bourgeois aesthetic consciousness or modem 
consumerist allegory, then how ought we to strive toward the former. This question is 
encumbered by two fundamental paradoxes, namely the paradoxical question of the aim of 
revolutionary re-inventions of our relation to materiality, and the paradox of the means of 
our own transformation. Surrealism and Benjamin’s historical materialism can be understood 
as systems of understanding which attempt to address these paradoxes through the 
development of theoretical structures and corresponding ‘experiential documents.’ These 
systems recapitulate many of the virtues of Baudelaire’s ode to modernity, while buttressing 
it w ith ‘experiential accounts’ that are replete with inassimilable alterity.
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With respect to the first paradoxical question, namely the aim of revolutionary
materialistic reinvention, Benjamin offers us a sense of the underlying challenge. Benjamin
writes in his 1940 “On the Concept of History” that “the image of happiness we cherish is
thoroughly coloured by the time to which the course of our own existence has assigned us”
(SW4, 389). If the image of happiness we cherish, which is to say the object of our own re-
invention, is a function of our times, just as Baudelaire’s image of beauty is a function its
time, then our attempts to articulate the direction of revolutionary re-invention will be
burdened by the extent to which they are already determined by the present. The historical
materialist utopia then becomes the very no-where the Greek etymology implies because it is
articulated only through the lens of the present, yet it cannot be of that present, insofar as
that present structures its possible imaginations. . ' ̂
The: paradox of the means of perceptual transformation follows from this
problematic. How could cognition resolve to reform itself if  the scope of its ideal is already
circumscribed by its necessary historical contingency? Gan cognition merely resolve to
perceive anew and suddenly reform itself? Where does ‘the new’ arrive from? Might the
materiality of culture play some formative role, which is to say, does something from beyond
the scope of our knowledge and expectations intervene in cognition to occasion a
transformation in a movement that is kindred with grace or revelation? Benjamin’s curious
1939 essay “On Some Motifs in Baudelaire” complicates this paradoxical impasse.
Recapitulating a theory of voluntary and involuntary memory in Proust, Benjamin writes:
One afternoon, the taste of a kind of pastry called a madeleine transported him V 
[Proust] back to the past, whereas before then he had been limited to the 
promptings of a memory which obeyed the call of conscious attention. [.. .] In 
sum, Proust says that the past is situated “somewhere beyond the reach of the 
intellect and its field of operations, in some material object..., though we have 
no idea which one it is. And whether we come upon this object before we die, or 
whether we never encounter it, depends entirely on chance.” (SW4, 315)
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According to the passage, prior to Proust’s encounter with the madeleine he was limited in his 
investigations of the past to the promptings of his conscious attention. The latent power of 
the madeleine was hidden from him in plain view. Proust’s ingestion of the madeleine signifies 
an encounter with alterity which could not be predicted. The latent historical power of the 
object is necessarily situated beyond the reach of his intellect, and therefore inaccessible to 
Proust until a particular moment in which he encounters this singular piece of materiality in 
this singular way. The madeleine disrupts the scope of the conscious promptings that had 
heretofore determined Proust’s capacity to cognize himself and to uncover his own past. The 
material object in this example forces a reordering of its own cognition. Proust’s madeleine 
illustrates that the question of the means of transforming ways of seeing in modernity, the 
question of facilitating the recognition of the proliferation of^the languages of humanity, 
demands an approach which suspends subject-object distinctions and the corresponding 
assumptions regarding agency and freewill.
The discovery of the historical determination of things is eminently liberating insofar 
as it discloses the extent to which cognition is ultimately open to revolution and
V
transformation, but also eminently paradoxical. The discovery demonstrates that our desires 
and our images of happiness are ultimately guided by the time to which we have been 
assigned. Transformation cannot be summarily accomplished through an act of voluntary 
memory, but demands patience. As Benjamin suggests, “whether we come upon this object 
before we die, or whether we never encounter it, depends entirely on chance.” Navigating 
this problematic is the challenge of the dialectical thinker. Both Louis Aragon, in his Paris 
Peasant collection, and Benjamin take this up in their works. A close examination of both 
authors yields two similar yet compellingly different attempts to develop this project.
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2.4 On The Relation Between Materialand the Image in Surrealism
Benjamin’s 1929 essay “Surrealism” contains a curious characterization and celebration of a
certain variety of surrealist writing. While the surrealist movement provided many theoretical
affirmations of its investigations in its many manifestos throughout the 1920s and 30s,
Benjamin restricts his investigation of surrealism to a particular literary form which was
developed pre-eminently by Louis Aragon and André Breton, namely the ‘experiential
document.5 Benjamin suggests that for
anyone who has perceived that the writings of this circle [the surrealists] are 
not literature but something else—demonstrations, watchwords, documents, 
bluffs, forgeries if  you will, but at any rate not literature—will also know, for 
the same reason, that the writings are concerned literally with experiences, 
not with theories, and still less with phantasms (SW 2.1, 208)
The surrealist experiential document, exemplified by works such as André Breton’s Nadja and
Louis Aragon’s Paris Peasant, is not a piece of theory or fantasy. It is a demonstration or
watchword of a certain moment of experience that is attained by the movement of “the
‘poetic life’ to the utmost limits of possibility.” Like Monsieur G’s lithographs, which bring to
visibility an ephemeral moment, the fragmentary surrealist ‘experiential document’
concretizes an experience of that which flees with the same urgency of a dream upon
waking.
“The Peasant’s Dream” is the final section of Aragon’s 1926 surrealist novel Paris 
Peasant. This section, which is referred to by commentator Simon Taylor as a ‘corrective’ or 
explanatory reflection (PP, x) provides Aragon’s readers with an account of the basis of the 
‘experiential documents’ that fill the first two sections of this work. “The Peasant’s Dream” 
stands in relation to the ‘experiential document’ in the same way Baudelaire’s “The Painter of 
Modem Life” does to the lithographs of Monsieur G. Consequently, this section offers a
55
number of fertile avenues for the understanding and unfurling of Aragon’s thought.
In the introduction to his corrective Aragon maintains that:
the world exists in a state of unthinkable disorder: the extraordinary thing 
about this is that men should have habitually sought beneath the surface 
appearance of disorder for some mysterious order, one that comes naturally : 
to them, that merely expresses an innate desire within them, and they have 
no sooner introduced this order into things than they start going into 
raptures about it, making this order the basis of an idea, or alternatively 
explaining this order by an idea. (PP, 190)
Of foremost importance in the above selection is the suggestion that the world challenges us
with an “unthinkable disorder” that “man” habitually shrinks from. Aragon’s example seeks
to emphasize the extent to which everyday habits of cognition ultimately disappoint in the
face of the myriad potential ways in which the world might be encountered. Aragon’s ‘men’
constantly understand their unthinkably disordered world through a number of inadequate
and ultimately unfounded ordering principles. Like the contemporary Bourgeois individual
who meets the singular object 1 table' with an allegorical reduction to exchange value,
Aragon’s ‘men’ meet the difference of the world with their own understandings. Further, the
formulations they settle upon present themselves as necessary. Yet according to Aragon
these feelings of necessity are merely mechanisms through which the underlying contingency
of their categories of understanding are concealed. Necessity is the paralyzing supplement to
any contingent ordering principle that obscures and ultimately cushions against any
confrontation with the “unthinkable disorder” which is the essence of the actual world.
Aragon effectively articulates a dualistic ontology. On the one hand there exists
“unthinkable disorder,” a realm of being that resists and rejects every attempt at being
thought, and on the other there are inadequate attempts to reify this “unthinkable disorder”
into coherent structures of meaning. The realm of material is at once irreparably separated
from the realm of meaning and cognition, while at the same defined as its locus. Andre
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Breton writes in the first “Manifesto of Surrealism” that "[i]f in a cluster of grapes there are 
no two alike, why do you want me to describe this grape by the other, by all the others, why 
do you want me to make a palatable grape? Our brains are dulled by the incurable mania of 
wanting to make the unknown known, classifiable” (MS, 9). The grape in this example is at 
once the site of 'palatable’ amalgamations of taxonomic meaning, but also the site that resists 
appropriation and cognition.
The challenge for the 'thinking man’ Aragon goes on to suggest, is to somehow 
sustain the unthinkable disorder in his experience of the world, to retain the un-re­
presentable singularity of all encounters. Aragon writes that "for the thinking man who does
not obscure his ideal perception by the constant control and cross-checking of each moment
/
of his thought [...] for such a man disorder is capable of achieving transition to a concrete 
state” (PP, 191). But, yet again, we are confronted with a paradox. The image of the 
unthinkable, sustained by a particular individual at a particular time, like Benjamin’s notion of 
happiness, "is thoroughly coloured by the time to which the course of our own existence has 
assigned us.” The image of disorder, which is always formed in distinction from images of 
order, is understood only within the horizon of a particular time and place. The pursuit of a 
concrete "unthinkable disorder” is a continuous process of self-negation and transcendence. 
Aragon recognizes this when, through a slight modification of an old mythological story, he 
suggests that "there is no rest for Sisyphus, but his stone does not roll down again, it ascends
i •
and must not cease to ascend” (PP, 196).
The very form of the majority of Aragon’s Paris Peasant reflects this renewed pursuit 
of the concrete-as-disorder. According to his later autobiographic reflections, Aragon 
suggests that Paris Peasant is a "novel that would break all the traditional rules governing the 
writing of fiction, one that would be neither a narrative (a story) nor a character study (a
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portrait)” (PP, xi). In a sense, it is a novel that attempts to write-from the position of the
surrealist ontology of “unthinkable disorder” (PP, 190). In the place of conventional
(
narrative structures, that might offer unified and persistent images of places, characters and 
events—and thus yoke the unthinkable disorder, of the world 1 to different ordering 
principles—Aragon offers his readers a number of tenuously connected sketches of what can 
be termed Surrealist experiences’ which unfold again and again in the streets and arcades of 
Paris. In opposition to what André Breton terms the “realistic attitude” toward fiction in his 
first “Manifesto of Surrealism” (1924), where things, people, and places can be described 
according to permanent and essential natures, Aragon negates coherent geography in favour 
of a narrative perspective that moves at once listlessly, and then impassionedly, through a 
world that layers places onto other places, and times onto other times. Aragon favours the 
immanent description, the poetic image that presents itself in a flash before receding into the 
stratified sediment of past reflections and past insights. Benjamin, in his essay on surrealism, 
suggests that Breton, but also implicitly Aragon, were “the first to perceive the revolutionary 
energies that appear in the “outmoded”—in the first iron constructions, the first factory 
buildings, the earliest of photos, objects that have begun to be extinct” (SW2, 210). Aragon’s 
narrative strives to give voice to the singularity that is proper to these materials—iron 
constructions, early photos—which are otherwise understood through the category of the 
outmoded.
In one of the many illustrative passages of Paris Peasant, and one of the most famous 
‘experiential documents’ of the entire work, Aragon’s narrator describes his encounters with 
the objects that populate the arcades of Paris. The arcade is a dialectical setting. As a 
principal site of cosmopolitan consumerism, it bears witness to a flattened and impoverished 
dimension of modem experience in which materiality is reduced to pragmatic exchange
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values. At the same time it is also the site of the consumer fetish in all of its intoxicating
depth. As the time and space of Parisian fashion it attests to the succession of time on the
one hand, and the timelessness of the fetish object on the other. Aragon's narrator gives
account of his experience of this space, elevating the latent experiential qualities of the fetish
experience of space into a poetical transformation of time and space. After finishing several
drinks at a nearby café, Aragon's narrator walks off into the passage. Aragon continues: ; .
By that time the lights had already been switched off. My attention was 
suddenly attracted to a sort of humming noise which seemed to be coming 
from the direction of the cane shop, and I was astonished to see that its 
window was bathed in a greenish, almost submarine light, the source of 
which became invisible. It was the same kind of phosphorescence that, I 
remember, emanated from the fish I watched, as a child, from the jetty of 
Port Bail on the Cotentin peninsula; but still, I had to admit to myself that 
even though the canes might conceivably possess the illuminating properties 
of creatures of the deep, a physical explanation would still scarcely account 
for this supernatural gleam and, above all, the noise whose low throbbing 
echoed back from the arched roof. I recognized the sound: it was the same 
voice of the seashells that has never ceased to amaze poets and film stars.
The whole ocean in the Passage de l'Opéra. The canes floated gently like 
seaweed. (PP, 21-22)
In Aragon's experiential account, the material object that is inscribed within the order of
capital is seen anew. The unacknowledged or repressed dialectical tensions which underpin
modem experience are brought to ecstatic expression. The singular encounter between the
( '
narrator and his environment invokes correspondences that overwhelm him with overlaid 
images of childhood. In the moment of illumination, objects are freed of their existence 
within geometric coordinates and successive moments. The narrator of Paris Peasant 
encounters an eternal time through the sound of the seashell which bridges the ancient and 
modem. Inviolable spatial principles are violated in the experience of the whole ocean in the 
“Passage de l'Opéra.” Benjamin's emphatic assertion that surrealist literature should not be 
relegated to fiction, but should be understood as demonstrations and watchwords suggests 
that these spans of time are reflective of modem ecstatic experience. These indigestible
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illuminations resist Kantian interpretations of experience, and leave open the possibility of 
unique reconfigurations of sensibility. ;
Benjamin writes in his essay on surrealisnxthat “to say nothing of Aragon's Passage de 
I’Opera, Breton and Nadja are the lovers who convert everything that we have experienced on 
mournful railway journeys [...]■ on godforsaken Sunday afternoons in the proletarian 
neighborhoods of great cities [...] into revolutionary experience, if  not action” (SW 2, 210). 
Aragon's narrative is replete with these correspondences and revelations. The moment of 
longing is arrested in Aragon's Paris Peasant. Before this moment of insight or feeling can be 
“cross-checked” against “all the preceding moments” of his life, before it can be understood 
within a general economy of emotional equilibrium, it is isolated and left in the open air 
where it unsettles and challenges literary realism's attempts to cover it over. Each of these 
experiences gives a brief, albeit fleeting, insight into the different ways, in which the world 
can be constituted. Later Aragon will write that “most images are' registered so weakly by the 
mind employing them that they incarnate absolutely no estimation of reality” (PP, 201). Yet 
by seizing these weak and fleeting images, and recording them, Aragon invites his readers to 
perform the same operation.
Aragon’s Experiences' are not speculative musings. They are not theories, insofar as 
theoria is the art of articulating the ordering principles of the world, of articulating an eagle- 
eye view. Where theory is the domain of the universal, the domain of the surrealist 
experience is a particular that confounds universality. The surrealist document is a trace or 
recording that gives voice to the muted language of things.
Benjamin suggests that “it is a cardinal error to believe that, of ‘surrealist 
experiences,' we know only the religious ecstasies or the ecstasies of drugs” (SW 2,209). This 
is an important point, and it suggests another way in which Aragon’s experiential documents
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function. While Aragon’s writings can, on one level, be understood in their revolutionary 
potential within the context of their execution and recording—the revelation of the whole 
ocean in the.Passage de VOpéra is that moment that confounds the surrounding value laden 
Bourgeois object-image of materiality—Aragon’s writings also function as a litmus-test for 
his readers, h r the Passage de VOpéra we are tempted to reductively interpret Aragon’s 
experiences as those of a drunk, or else a mystic. These are categories that re-inscribe the 
surreal experience within a traditional— and reactionary—economy of experience. To 
understand the illuminations that populate Aragon’s text as symptoms, brought on merely by 
some intoxication—in distinction from the detoxified order of regular experience—we evade 
a confrontation with the extent to which our own experience rests on discontinuity and 
revelatory moments. We privilege, in that interpretive gesture,-'the voice that suggests that a 
moment of longing on a train is merely a function of distance or the stale air in the
compartment. In understanding ‘surrealist experience’ as a drug-induced ecstasy, we yoke the
/
particular to a historically contingent category of understanding.
The surrealist ‘experiential document’ reprises the form of Monsieur G’s lithograph, 
but develops the flash of insight or ‘profane illumination’ into an indigestible fragment. 
While the particular cut of a dress, inscribed on a lithographic plate by Monsieur G., might 
not evoke a ‘shock effect’ in the Bourgeois subject, the surrealist illumination, through the 
magic of the idiosyncratic languages it uncovers, polemically interrupts the position of the 
reader, opening them to the possibility of a redeemed relationship to language and meaning.
2.5 O n ‘Historical Materialist Experience’ in Walter Benjamin
Benjamin’s historical materialism, like Aragon’s theory of surreal experience, is a theory of 
experience which seeks to interrupt prescribed modes of constituting the materiality of the
I
present into meaning. Anticipated in his early theoretical writings such as “On the Coming 
Philosophy” and “On Language as Such,” Benjamin’s mature work develops his initial 
impulses into far reaching critical reflections on culture and history. This is intimated in his 
reflections on surrealism, and borne out through an attentive overview of his writings from 
the 1930s. Echoing Baudelaire’s contestation of Bourgeois manners of relating to art, 
Benjamin’s essay “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction” seeks to 
identify the possibility of new social modes of perception which arise from technological 
developments in art production. Caygill compellingly argues in Walter'benjamin: The Colour o f  
Experience that one of Benjamin’s main objectives in the first draft of his mechanical 
reproduction essay is to challenge the rhetoric of the 'authenticity’ and 'uniqueness’ through 
which artworks were evaluated by his contemporaries. Caygill’s interpretation suggests that 
according to Benjamin the values of “uniqueness, genius and eternal validity” which were 
inherited by contemporaneous art historians are not universal values of artworks, but rather 
inherited values from an older tradition. According to Benjamin the Ancient Greeks 
developed these values as 'compensatory mechanisms’ in response to their technologically 
limited capacity to reproduce and modify completed artworks. A marble statue, for instance, 
affords little or no modification once it is completed. In a powerful inversion of the 
deficiencies of their art forms, the Ancient Greeks made the flaws of their artworks-— 
necessity, singularity and fixity—into virtues instead. The Ancient Greek artwork, which 
cannot respond to future cultural eventualities, is perversely celebrated for its fixity. Benjamin 
poses these materially determined values against modem art-mediums, such as film-making, 
or implicidy the lithograph, which lend themselves to transformation according to new s ocial 
forces, demonstrating the historical contingency of approaches to art criticism, and signalling 
a redemptive potential in current technologies. Benjamin thus polemically challenges his
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contemporaries to champion the potentially indeterminate contemporary art-work instead of 
disavowing i t  Modem artwork, according to Benjamin’s critique of the tradition, should 
strive toward adequacy with the, to quote Baudelaire, “relative, circumstantial elements” of 
experience. It is further enjoined to distribute these experiences to a mass audience, like the 
lithographs of Monsieur G, or the experiential documents of the surrealists. Benjamin writes 
that “[t]he adjustment of reality to the masses and of the masses to reality is a process of 
unlimited scope, as much for thinking as for perception” (CE, 103).
Likewise, Benjamin’s 1937 essay “Eduard Fuchs, Collector and Historian” elaborates 
this critique of the cannon of formal legitimacy into a critique of historical research as such.
The essay maintains that Eduard Fuchs, a nineteenth century “collector who strayed into
/
marginal areas—such as caricature and pornographic imagery”/(SW3, 268) is an exemplary 
art historian. In the.essay Benjamin praises Fuchs’ capacity to extend the scope of ‘art’ to 
marginalized practices of representation. Much like Baudelaire’s Monsieur G, who employs a 
definite technology of representation to bring an unexplored field of experience into public
i •
visibility, Benjamin’s Eduard Fuchs pioneered a materialistic consideration of art by 
producing history books illustrated with archival works-—“documentary pictures”—as 
opposed to illustrations “by living artists” which would otherwise impose a contemporary 
inflection, or way of seeing, on the past (SW3, 264). Fuchs is, according to Benjamin, the 
“pioneer of a materialistic consideration of art” (SW3, 261).
Benjamin’s celebration of Eduard Fuchs is pre-empted in his analysis of André 
Breton in “Surrealism.” According to the surrealism essay, Breton possessed an exceptional 
capacity to “bring the immense forces of ‘atmosphere’” concealed in the ‘outmoded’ “to the 
point of explosion” (SW 2,210). Benjamin writes that the “first factory buildings, the earliest 
photos, objects that have begun to be extinct,” all pieces of material culture that are forced
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out of expression in language, and therefore forced out o f. cognition by the course of 
history, are the very pieces of culture Breton seeks to integrate into the fold of his research. 
Breton’s capacity to interrupt the procession of history and redeem the 'outmoded5 is 
celebrated by Benjamin not only because it brushes against the grain of voguish capitalism, 
but more importantly because it suggests other ways in  which culture can be re-constituted. 
Breton, Fuchs, and modem technologies of art, all possess the capacity to stir moments of 
cultural reflection on the contingency of any mode of cognition. The universalizing language 
of art history, and the cultural language of the new, are confronted by these figures. A 
materialist history of caricature, a poetically modulated engagement with the unwieldy 
'things5 of history are positioned in their place, furnishing the conditions of the possibility 
of the "Philosophy of the Future.55 '  ^
Benjamin’s varied responses to the work of Baudelaire and the surrealists—including 
his explicit critiques of their methods as well as his independent explorations of coincident 
themes—attain their most concentrated expression in Benjamin’s final work, the theses “On 
the Concept of History.” The principle object of the theses on history is to develop a 
reflection on the tension between a revolutionary 'materialist history5 and the reactionary 
tradition of monolithic nineteenth century 'historicism.5 fiistoricism, a philosophy of history 
epitomized, according to Benjamin, by Leopold von Ranke, suggests that the events of the 
past can be ordered according to an “'eternal5 image of the past” (SW4, 396). Benjamin 
writes that “historicism rightly culminates in universal history. [...] Universal history has no 
theoretical armature. Its procedure is additive: it musters a mass of data to fill the 
homogeneous, empty time” (SW4, 396). Instead of striving to apprehend the different 
vantage points from which, for instance, the 'outmoded5 iron bridge could appear rich with 
life again, the historicist instead strives to add examples that fortify his existing image of the
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past. The materiality on which he bases his narrative of history is not encountered in its 
singularity, but rather its singularity is subordinated to the “eternal” image. The methodology 
of universal history does not admit the possibility of a ‘madeleine,’ or any other object which 
might threaten to reconfigures the coordinates of its image of the past. '
In marked contrast to historicism, Benjamin attempts to elaborate a philosophy of 
history that strives to adequately meet the disparate singularities that make up the substance 
of history. Benjamin writes:
Materialist historiography [...] is based on a constructive principle. Thinking 
involves not only the movement of thoughts, but their arrest as well. Where 
thinking suddenly comes to a stop in a constellation saturated with tensions, it 
gives that constellation a shock, by which thinking is crystallized as a monad.
[ . . . ] ' in this structure he. [the historical materialist] recognizes the sign of a 
messianic arrest of happening, or (to put it differently) a revolutionary chance 
in the fight for the oppressed past. (SW 4,396)
Benjamin’s elaboration of the task of historical materialism recalls Aragon’s attempts to seize
and presence those fleeting images that appeared to him on the streets of Paris..The task of
the historical materialist is to somehow rupture the narrative of things lost to history for
long enough that the monadological singularity or better — the singular language of the
things of historical research —can present itself again. By pursuing these singular encounters
/
with the material on which history is formed, Benjamin’s ideal historian strives to redeem 
possibilities forced out of the present. In the space of an instant the oppression of the past 
lifts. In a moment o f ‘profane illumination’ the historical materialist, like the surrealist, 
understands an altogether new way of constituting.the materiality of the world into images 
and thoughts. The historical materialist, like the surrealist or painter of modem life attempts 
to attain a relation to material culture that is faithful to the ephemeral.
By describing the theoretical task that sustains historical materialist history in “On 
the Concept o f History,” Benjamin implies at once that history can be written, that historical
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documents are producible, and that revolutionary historical experience is possible. This 
ultimately raises the question of how historical materialist writing might look. Historical 
writing is conventionally understood according to structures of narrative. Yet narrative 
history sustains the monological principles of historicism. It attempts to explain a series of 
events according to a governing thematic principle that is ultimately grounded in the present. 
History for Benjamin does not subordinate the singularity of its diverse materiality to a single 
mode of cognition. History is made from discontinuous fractured revelations that constellate 
difference rather than eternal sameness. How would such a writing look, and how might it 
address the threat of lapsing into narrative history?
. Ultimately, I believe itV  fruitful to consider the possibility that the form of the 
‘experiential document5 that is advanced in surrealist writing might be the proper form of a 
nascent historical materialist history. When Benjamin describes the surrealist documents of 
experience as “not literature but something else—demonstrations, watchwords, documents, 
bluffs, forgeries if  you will, but at any rate not literature55 which are concerned “literally with 
experiences, not with theories, and still less with phantasms55 (SW 2.1, 208) Benjamin might 
as well describe his own documentations of historical experience. Just as the surrealist 
experiential document records the trace of a moment of profane illumination, the document 
of historical materialism should testify to a historical illumination. The historical materialist 
document should disrupt the continuity of the present with an experience of the claim of 
the past.
Thus, we can say that Benjamin’s 1931 essay “Unpacking my Library,55 written just 
two years after “Surrealism,55 and in the midst of his affiliation with the French surrealist 
circle, offers the sketches of such an account. It is important to emphasize at the outset of 
our analysis that the essay, while subtitled “A Talk about Book Collecting,55 does not offer any
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explicit recommendations regarding book collecting. Further, the essay does not seek to 
develop the collector’s relation to the narratives which are contained in the pages of his 
collection, but rather the collector’s relation to the material history of the books-as-objects. 
The essay is about book collecting, not story or literature collecting.
The collector, in the tradition of Baudelaire’s typologies, is a figure who attends 
rather compulsively to the acquisition of theobjects of his chosen field. While it might ask 
too much to suggest that Monsieur G. and Louis Aragon are collectors of the ephemeral, there 
is a preliminary affinity between the character type of the collector and their work. The 
collector’s collection is also notable because, while a governing theme might foreground the 
orientation of a collection, this theme does not subordinate the objects o f the collection. 
The collected objects, while ordered and organized, are preserved in their singularity. The 
task of articulating a body of historical materialist research, while attempting to resist the 
tendency toward historicism in the overwhelming majority of attempts to encompass the 
past might find an appropriate home in the activity and methods of the collector
Benjamin concretizes these suggestions in writing that “the acquisition of books is 
by no means a matter of money or expert knowledge alone” (IL, 63). The book collector is 
more than a wise investor, or an obsessive cataloguer The collector is attuned to the singular 
material provenances that make up his collection. Benjamin writes that the collector is 
engaged in “a relationship to objects which does not emphasize their functional, utilitarian 
value— that is, their usefulness—but studies and loves them as the scene, the stage, of their 
fate” (IL, 60). The material histories of books are irreducible combinations of the histories 
of their acquisitions, disappearances, and fabrications. For Benjamin it is not even important 
to have read the books. Their value lies rather in their capacity to inspire us to contemplation 
of long forgotten people, subterranean literary traditions, and oppressed pasts. Benjamin
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writes “how many cities have revealed themselves to me in the marches I undertook in 
pursuit of books!” (IL, 63). Each’piece of the collector’s collection, can, in a moment of 
appropriate contemplation, recall and evoke the now absent histories of the collector’s own 
life. Just as Aragon’s narrator in Paris Peasant brings the atmosphere latent in outmoded
things to the point of explosion, the collector, in moments of illumination, can presence the
( '
depth of material histories. Appropriately Benjamin writes “one has only to watch a collector
handle the objects in his glass case. As he holds them in his hands, he seems to be seeing
through them into the distant past as though inspired” (IL, 61).
While “Unpacking my Library” serves to foreground the relation between the
collector and the surrealist or painter of modem life, the essay also crosses over into the
territory of the experiential: document. Benjamin begins theses say in the. present tense,
narrating the moment of uncovering the material of his book collection after two years of
storage. The tone is jarring and unconventional. He writes:
I am unpacking my library. Yes, l  am. The books are not yet on the shelves, not 
yet touched by the mild boredom of order I cannot march up and down their 
ranks to pass them in review before a friendly audience. You need not fear any 
of that. Instead, I must ask you to join me in the disorder of crates that have 
been wrenched open, the air saturated with the dust of wood, the floor covered 
with tom paper, to join me among piles of volumes that are seeing daylight 
again after two years of darkness, so that you may be ready to share with me a 
.. bit of the mood” (IL, 59)
Benjamin signals that he, a book collector himself, is conjuring the cmood’ or particular spirit
in which these long sealed material artefacts might come to life again, for himself and for his
readers. Among the disorder of the open crates, Benjamin is confronted with histories of his
own life he has forgotten. Benjamin suggests that once these books are placed back on the
shelves they will settle into a mild boredom of order, just as the site of Aragon’s Passage de
l 90pera  might appear, after his experience, as the banal site of cane shops and everyday
transactions. Yet for the brief span of time Benjamin seeks to document in this essay, these
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objects evoke forgotten histories and disclose a: mode of relating to materiality that is
oppressed by the present. By recording this span of time, Benjamin sustains the openness of
those fleeting insights which conventionally ‘flit by.’
Benjamin’s mood evolves as he works through his task. As he draws new books out
from their storage, he recalls scenes from his life that have been buried. In the spirit of
Proust’s madeleine which presences heretofore inaccessible histories, Benjamin is transported
to times and places he is estranged from. He describes that he is:
on the last half-emptied crate, and it is way past midnight. Other thoughts fill 
me than the ones I am talking about-—not thoughts but images, memories. 
Memories of the cities in which I found so many things: Riga, Naples,
Munich, Danzig, Moscow, Florence, Basel, Paris; memories of Rosenthal’s 
sumptuous rooms .in Munich, of the Danzig Stockturm, w;here the late Hans 
Rhaue was domiciled, of Sussengut’s musty book cellar in North Berlin [...] 
and finally of my boyhood room, the former location of only four or five of 
the several thousand volumes that are piled up around me.
(SW 2,492)
Benjamin’s experience of the material substance of the collection connects him with the past 
and transforms his surroundings. The mild boredom of order disappears in the room while 
his objects come to life. Their material, which conventionally seems to end at their surface,
V
discloses profound depth. Benjamin’s collection is latent with immense stretches of time and 
whole cities of Europe.
Benjamin’s experiential document is formally analogous to Aragon’s surreal 
document. The essay on book collecting outlines the trace of a moment of insight that habit 
and convention seek to repress or negate. Further, it sustains the moment of its illumination 
through rendering it into language. Benjamin as book collector, like the surrealist poet, 
attempts to discover and circulate a moment of fractured human language which announces 
itself in the midst of the muted language of the world. He is led to his collection like any 
collector, by the auspicious confluence of profane resolution and ineluctable circumstance.
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The insight of the book collector does not suffice to redeem human language, but it 
succeeds in manifesting the task.
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C h a p t e r  3 : T h e  A r c a d e s  - P r o j e c t , -  J  u d g e m e  n t  / a n d  
t h e  Re  d e  m p t i  o n o f  H i  s t o r y  :
3.1 O n The Arcades Project as the fulfilment of the Coming Philosophy
The object of this chapter, which serves in a way as a conclusion to this work, is to propose 
an interpretation of Benjamin’§ A rcades Project which situates the work as a fulfilment of what 
is suggested but postponed in his early theory on language and the coming philosophy. In 
distinction from Benjamin’s middle period writings, which develop the conditions of
redeemed language, the Arcades Project presents a concerted attempt to fulfill language.
/
According to this interpretation, the Arcades Project is an incomplete—and very possibly 
uncompletable—methodologically unified attempt to unite trace linguistic fragments of the 
“unique and temporally limited” moments of French cultural history in the nineteenth 
century into a montage-language which is open to the arrival of the purity of the ‘judging 
word’ , which would restore the adequacy of the languages of man to their referential object, 
namely nineteenth century Paris. -
According to Benjamin’s philosophy of history, the material objects of culture have 
an explosive potential to reconfigure existing modes of sensibility. In lieu of developing a 
historical account of ‘Paris in the 19th century’ which would preserve a narrative voice, thus 
substituting one moment of historically configured language for another, Benjamin’s Arcades 
Project curates a collection of madeleines of French history. Echoing the methodology of 
Benjamin’s essay “On Unpacking my Library” the Arcades Project collects citations so that 
they can ‘speak for themselves.’ Adorno wrote in his portrait of Benjamin that in the latter’ 
theoretical system “subjective intention is seen to be extinguished in the [encounter with the]
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object” and that “Benjamin’s thought is not content with intentions” (PR, 239). Through a 
process of accumulating material-linguistic fragments that^is guided at once by.critical 
intention and chance encounters, Benjamin develops a unified body of historical materialist 
research that strives toward adequacy with its object and gestures toward the possibility of 
the fulfilment of the Kantian theory of knowledge.
3.2 O n hie  A ngel of History, A ccumulation and Redemption ;
As the previous two chapters have attempted to demonstrate, Benjamin’s early essays 
“On Language as Such” and “On the Coming Philosophy” signal, the task of the future 
philosophy as one of somehow redeeming the Kantian project fo develop a transcendental 
consciousness in light of the question of ephemeral experience and the languages of man. 
Benjamin’s essays posit a theologically determined prelapsarian past in which human names
once held adequacy to the things of the world and a coming philosophy in which the clarity
/
and justification of the Kantian program might again find adequacy to ephemeral experience 
in a purified “transcendental / epistemological consciousness.” Benjamin’s middle period 
writings develop the conditions of the possibility of this coming philosophy in their 
concerted attempt to contest dominant social modes of cognizing ephemeral experience. In
his appropriation of the techniques of Baudelaire and the surrealists, Benjamin attempts to
\ '
facilitate a social recognition of the constitutive structure of experience, namely as that which 
is discontinuous and populated by myriad ephemeral experiences. The surrealist “magical 
experiments with words” or the lithographs of Monsieur G. make explicit the discontinuities, 
be they in the conception of beauty or the conception of the outmoded, which structure the 
present. In facilitating flashes of ‘profane illumination’ these early twentieth century
revolutionaries shore up the dreamlike instability of the present. To this end, Adorno, who 
might have had a more privileged access to the theoretical underpinnings of Benjamin’s 
writings than anyone else, writes in “A Portrait of Walter Benjamin” that ''[i]t is not 
[Benjamin’s] glance as such which lays claim to the unmediated possession of the absolute; 
rather [in] his manner of seeing, the entire perspective is altered. The technique o f  enlargement 
brings the rigid in motion and the dynamic to rest.” Adorno continues to suggest that Benjamin’s 
writings attend to “small or shabby objects like dust and plush” which are “a complement of 
this technique, drawn as it is to everything that has slipped through the conventional 
conceptual net or to things which have been esteemed too trivial by the prevailing spirit for it 
to have left any traces other than those of hasty judgement” (PB, 239). Benjamin’s manner of 
seeing, which is analogous to that of the surrealists, enlarges the'sm all or shabby’ object and, 
in so doing invests it with new life. This manner o f seeing challenges the norms of cognition 
that sustain mass cultural understandings of materiality and in a revelatory flash invokes the 
contingency that underpins all presents.
In spite o f Benjamin’s middle period writings, which celebrate those collections of 
the inassimilable that mark the discontinuity of the present, there is little indication of the 
progress of the historical materialist project toward the fulfilment of the coming philosophy. 
The time of judgement, in which the totality of ephemeral experience is sublimated into the 
Objective experience’ which is suggested as the condition of possibility of the coming 
philosophy, is suspended until a later time. In light ofBenjamin’s attempt to neutralize the 
categories of 'subject’ and 'object,’ the ethical task of'judging’ or sifting through the revealed 
languages of humanity does not present any clear means of arresting the accumulation of 
knowledge of the discontinuous languages of humanity. The middle period works are 
concerned with the facilitation of the recognition of the proliferation of language and name.
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The historical materialist philosopher who emerges from Benjamin’s early and middle 
works is in many ways like Klee’s Angelus Novus. The angel of history, according to 
Benjamin’s ninth thesis “O n'the Concept of History,” has his face “turned towards the 
past.” He is situated so that “he seems to move away from something he stares at. His eyes 
are wide, his mouth is open, and his wings are spread.” The angel of history sees history as it 
is10. Benjamin writes:
[w]here a chain of events appears before us, he sees one single catastrophe, 
which keeps piling wreckage upon wreckage and hurls it at his feet. The 
angel would like to stay, awaken the dead, and make whole what has been 
smashed. But a storm is blowing from paradise and has got caught in his 
wings; it is so strong that the angel can no longer close them. This storm 
drives him irresistibly into the future to which his back is turned, while the 
pile of debris before him grows toward the sky. (SW4, 392)
i ■ • ĵ
Like the angel of history, the historical materialist has a''privileged insight into the 
‘catastrophic’ accumulation which comprises all that has been. His philosophical 
adversaries—historicists and Kantian subjects—generalize their moment of ‘unique and 
temporally limited’ experience into a modeLof history or consciousness as-such which 
presents them with an image of history or consciousness which forms a unified ‘chain of 
events.’ In distinction from these models; the historical materialist’s moments of ‘profane 
illumination’ awaken in him a recognition of the languages of humanity. These rise up in 
their diversity to form a pile of wreckage at his feet. In Benjamin’s characterization of the 
angel of history, he emphasizes that his movement into the future is driven by the winds 
which blow from paradise. The accumulating wreckage, the movement of time and history, 
result from the moment of rupture which marks the severance of the perfect adequacy of 
human names to things. In spite of all of the angel’s insight, Benjamin maintains that he 
cannot arrest his own movement. The angel would like to stay and transform his insight into
10 Benjamin writes in Convolute N o f his Arcades Project that “To write history ... means to cite history” 
[Nll,3].
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knowledge which might awaken the dead or “make whole what has been smashed,” but 
before any such application is possible he is swept away by the posdapsarian storm.
The angel of history is characterized in the fragment by . three physical attributes: 
spread wings, open eyes, and an open mouth. Interpreting his figure symbolically, the angel’s 
wings are the markers of his exception. The angel’s status in the classical chain of ontological 
determination, somewhere between humanity and divinity, elevates him above common 
humanity and endows him with a capacity to perceive the true unfolding of history. But the 
very wings that mark his superhuman position are also the very anatomy by which he is 
swept forward. The storm from paradise “has got caught in his wings” and he cannot close 
them. The angel is cursed in his blessedness. His insight into the constitution of history does 
not yield a resolution of his movement but seems to further it."likewise, the insights of the 
historical materialist do not yield an absolute or finished system, but rather proliferate his 
struggle.
The angel’s face is characterized by open eyes and open mouth. His open eyes signify 
his ceaseless attention to the accumulation of the catastrophe of history. The open eyes of 
the angel are exceptionally attuned to the light of profane illumination. They evoke 
Baudelaire’s aesthetic hero who can integrate an appreciation of the minor works of art 
history into his aesthetic engagement, or the surrealists who, in their finer moments elevate 
‘unthinkable disorder’ to the status of the concrete.
His open mouth is altogether more ambiguous in its significations. It could very well 
signify an astonished and speechless mouth that is rendered mute in the face of the 
catastrophe of the past. The open mouth of the angel of history would then be the sign of 
his witness to unspeakable horror. Or it might well be the sign of a mouth in speech, 
enunciating all that it sees: a mouth which facilitates the recognition of the accumulating
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catastrophe, a mouth which attempts to speak in the myriad languages of humanity. Finally, 
the open mouth could signify a waiting, a suspension of the pronouncement of name until 
that time of judgement when naming w ill be restored to its perfect commensurability with 
things. The angel’s mouth is speechless, not from the impossibility of speech, but in its 
patience. The mouth is open because it is poised like a sprinter on a starting block, ready for 
a gunshot to announce the time of the arrival of the possibility of the pure and felicitous 
name. . :
1 In support of the third interpretation, B enj amin writes in the fragment B of his 
“Theses on History”
[w]e know that the Jews were prohibited from inquiring into the future: the 
Torah and the prayers instructed them in remembrance. This disenchanted 
the future, which holds sway over all those who turn to soothsayers for 
enlightenment. This does not imply, however, that for the Jews the future 
i became homogeneous, empty time. For every second was the small gateway 
in time through which the Messiah might enter. (SW 4,397)
The Torah’s injunction to remembrance and its implicit prohibition against attention to the
future is evocative of the temporal alignment of Angelas Novus. The pious Jew stands with his
back to the future, and his eyes trained on the past. His temporal orientation is identical to
that of the angel of history. Beyond this initial affinity, Benjamin’s suggestion that the site of
the return of the messiahis a “small gateway” suggests affinities with the open mouth of the
angel of history. Harry Zohn renders the German phrase “die kleine Pforte”. as ‘small
gateway’ in his above-cited translation, though it could just as well be rendered as portal,
opening, or doorway. The mouth is the portal through which names are spoken onto the
world. It would be appropriate to entertain the possibility that messiah might return through
the open mouth, in the fulfilment of the unformed speech of the angel of history. As
Benjamin’s third thesis suggests, the day of judgement is that time in which the past would
“become citable in all its moments” (SW4, 390). The day of judgement is that day in which
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the ‘accumulating catastrophe’ would be citable through its pure name. The return of the 
messiah would be the moment when the movement of the angel of history stops—when 
through the angel’s mouth the names of the objects before him are pronounced according to 
their prelapsarian dignity.
With respect to Benjamin’s historical materialism, the above images provide a fertile 
ground for collecting Benjamin’s reflections on the ethical ambiguity of the historical 
materialist’s orientation to his task. Benjamin’s early goal of ‘neutralizing’ the concepts of 
subject and object was shown to complicate the question of judgement. According to the 
essay on language “[i]n the Fall, since the eternal purity of names was violated, the sterner 
purity of the judging word arose” (SW1, 71). The judging word promises the possibility of 
arbitrating between the languages of humanity, but the judging word is not reducible to 
volitional utterances of the subject. It is dialectically structured between the divine activity of 
God and the profane military officer’s citation a Tordre du jou r ,; The profane judging word is 
spoken onto the collected and reported events of the day, while the divine judging word, 
which has yet to pronounce itself onto the world, w ill take up the events of a ll that has 
passed. Likewise, Benjamin’s essay “On the Coming Philosophy” emphasizes that f o r  us “an 
objective relation between the empirical consciousness and the objective concept of 
experience is impossible” (SW1, 104). Human reflection on the moments of empirical 
consciousness cannot accomplish the sublation of empirical consciousness into objective 
consciousness. The transformation is deferred to a ‘coming’ time which is pregnant with the 
possibility of its resolution. The tasks o f the historical materialist philosopher, defined as the 
formulation of objective consciousness and the restoration of language, are not manifestly 
accomplished in his work. His mouth remains open, anticipating the moment when name 
might be redeemed.
. This is not to suggest that the necessity of a messianic supplement to the work of the
present absolves the historical materialist of her responsibility to her work. Her work is
fuelled by an. ineluctable responsibility to the claim of materiality on the present. Thus the
angel, or the historical materialist, cannot 'close his wings’ or resign herself from the
obligations entailed by her insight. Adorno suggests as much when he writes:
Benjamin’s intention [with the Arcades Project] was to eliminate all overt 
commentary and to have the meanings [of the text] emerge solely through a 
shocking montage of the material. His aim was not merely for philosophy to 
catchup to surrealism, but for it to become surrealistic. In One-Way Street h e  
■ wrote that citations from his works were like highwaymen, who suddenly 
descend on the reader to rob him of his convictions. He meant this literally.
The culmination of his anti-subjectivism, his major work was to consist 
solely of citations. (PB, 238)
Like the pious Jew  or the-angel of history, the collector of historical fragments amasses with
her eyes trained exclusively on the past. Historical materialist research cannot proceed
according to a teleological structure, or it risks the possibility of subordinating its material
encounters to 'wishes’ and expectations of the present. The historical materialist suspends
grand narratives of historicism and progress in the interest of maintaining the integrity of the
profane illuminations, which populate her work. Benjamin’s historical materialist project is an
archive of material fragments that are lodged within a particular surreal manner of
/
perception, charged with the rupturing potential of the Madeleine. Benjamin aspires to 
compose a montage of material that would somehow disrupt the convictions of 
interpretation which guide his readers to their engagement with the work itself. The fragment 
as ‘highwayman’ disrupts the subject from without, and in so doing undermines the self 
determination which is critical to any theory of the subject. It is out of these considerations 
that the methodological underpinnings of the Arcades Project begin to emerge.
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3.3 O n the G en esis o f  the A r c a d e s  Project
Benjamin’s Arcades Project is a vast and uncompleted work. According to Rolf Tiedemann’s 
essay “Dialectics at a Standstill: Approaches to the P a ssa g en -W erk the genesis of the Arcades 
Project C2SL be roughly localized in the late 1920s. In 1926 Benjamin paid his first visit to Paris 
(AP, 930) and began his storied engagement with the surrealists, whose ‘experiential 
documents’ provided him with the initial inspiration for the citational structure of the work 
(AP, 933). The project was intended to culminate in a short philosophical and historical essay 
on Paris in the nineteenth century (AP, 930), where following from the surrealists, the work 
would eschew conventional narrative histories and instead develop from citations and 
fragmentary criticism. The generative influences in the project are contested, but 
commentator Stathis Gourgouris suggests in his 2003 essay on the Arcades Project “The 
Dream-Reality of the Ruin” that the structure of the work is directly indebted to Freud, 
Brecht, and the surrealists (WBAP, 207). Likewise, Susan Buck-Morss suggests in her 1989 
Dialectics a t a Standstill that the work “merges elements of Surrealism and Proust, Marx and 
Freud, with those of historical generations and childhood cognition in a blend that is bound 
together more by literary than logical means” (DS, 253).
In the development of these influences Benjamin compiled an array of quotations 
organized according to distinct topics such as the Arcades, Daguerre and the World 
Exhibition and condensed them into a handful of subheadings. The first of these drafts was 
submitted in 1935 to the Instituí fur Sozialforschung, under the title “Paris, the Capital of the 
Nineteenth Century” to secure funding for the remainder of the project.
According to Tiedemann, these initial essays give only a small glimpse of Benjamin’s 
overall project, which Benjamin developed until his untimely death in 1940. Barring the
second extended draft of his initial essay, which he submitted in 1939 to Max Horkheimer 
with the hope of securing an American benefactor, Benjamin continued to collect fragments 
for his Arcades Project with the aim of composing them into a concrete text. A work that 
began with an attempt to draw a limited range of fragments and citations together into an 
essay length collection ultimately unfolded into a sprawling collection which Tiedemann 
suggests “would have been nothing less than a materialist philosophy of the history of the 
nineteenth century” (AP, 929). A ll told, the final iteration of the Arcades Project organizes 
thousands of quotations into thirty-six ‘Convolutes,’ which together span close to nine 
hundred total pages in print. The sections cover topics as diverse as arcades, the collector, 
iron construction, mirrors, Marx, prostitution and modes of modem fighting. The citations 
are derived from ‘high’ and ‘low5 culture. They include snippets of" advertisements, economic 
statistics, quotations from Baudelaire and the “International Association of Workers.55 The 
citations are interspersed with Benjamin’s commentaries, which come to dominate certain 
Convolutes and which are almost entirely absent from others. ;,
The work as it stands today, conveniendy bound in by Harvard university’s Belknap 
Press, gives a sense of cohesion to the project that far outstrips whatever actual character the 
work attained in Benjamin’s fife. Like the majority of Benjamin’s recendy published writings, 
the Arcades Project was unpublished at the time of his death. With the exception of several 
sections from Benjamin’s ‘Convolute’ pertaining to the theory of knowledge and progress— 
which were reworked into his reflections on Fuchs and his theses on history—and his 
‘Convolute’ addressing Baudelaire, the work was conducted in private and remained in 
private. While Benjamin gave some indication of its development to close friends, there is 
fitde critical consensus regarding the question of whether it was ultimately developed toward 
the possibility of publication. f
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Benjamin fled Paris in 1939 as Europe erupted into war His private ‘project’ was 
entrusted, among other writings, to Georges Bataille who hid them in the basement of the 
Bibliothèque Nationale in Paris. The works were recovered after the war and as Benjamin 
rose to posthumous prominence in the latter half of the twentieth century a team of 
researchers chaired by Tiedemann compiled the diverse materials of Benjamin’s unfinished 
archive into a publication of the project under its original title, the Passagen-Werky in 1982. In 
distinction from the rest of Benjamin’s collected works, which were organized 
chronologically, Tiedemann made the editorial decision to assert an organization that was 
faithful to Benjamin’s thematic organization of the fragments of the project into topical
folders. The order of the folders in its current published form is only speculatively deduced
/ .
from prior sketches o£the structure of the project. ,•*
In light of the storied editorial history of the Arcades Project it would be foolhardy to 
approach the text as a completed document. As Gourgouris has emphasized,
i
“[r]eading Walter Benjamin’s Passagen-Werk means confronting the obdurate 
question of how one becomes — and what it means to become — the reader 
of an imaginary text. [...] the urgency and difficulty of the question concerns 
the construction of a reading position in regard to a work that never ceases 
being a project, resisting thus the present time of reading even after being 
fashioned into a printable text by a superior editor (Rolf Tiedemann), who 
self-consciously assumes the burden of enclosing an untamable project 
between two book covers. / (WBAP, 201)
The Arcades Project is an imaginary work. In its present editorial configuration it is simply the
imaginative reconstruction of a figure of what the Arcades Project might eventually have been,
provided it was even developed towards some publishable end. It also accomplishes
‘imaginary work’ in unfolding the imaginative structures and languages of nineteenth century
Paris. T h e Arcades Projectis thus a Passage-Work insofar as it concerns the concretization of the
fragments of ‘ephemeral experience’ which might have otherwise passed  unregistered though
nineteenth century Paris or twentieth century historical reflection.
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/  The text cannot be approached as a completed project, but rather as a work that 
“never ceases being a project.” As an object of theoretical interpretation then, we are left 
with the question of interpreting its directions and orientations. Unquestionably the work 
develops Benjamin’s reflections on historical materialist considerations of culture. Insofar as 
Benjamin suggests that Fuchs “is the pioneer of a materialist consideration of art” (SW3, 
261) because of his attempts to draw the marginalized artistic disciplines of ‘pornographic 
imagery’ and ‘caricature’ into the field of art history, we can conclude that Benjamin, in his 
integration of fleeting subjects such as gas-lamp-lighting and the flân eu r  into a sprawling 
program of historical research, becomes the historical materialist researcher par excellence. 
The incessant accumulation of the Arcades Project accompanies virtually all of his mature 
writings. But what guides his process of acquisition? Is it simply the claim that profane 
illumination makes on Benjamin? Is there any categorical difference between Benjamin’s 
published historical materialist research in essays such as “One Way Street” or “Unpacking 
my Library” and the Arcades Project? ^
Benjamin writes in Convolute N—the section of Arcades Project devoted to the 
“Theory of Knowledge and the Theory of Progress”-—that the Arcades Project is developed 
from a method of “literary montage.” Benjamin maintains “I needn’t say anything. Merely 
show. I shall purloin no valuables, appropriate no ingenious formulations. But the rags, the 
refuse—these I w ill not inventory but allow, in the only way possible, to come into their own: 
by making use of them. [N la,8]”. Our reflections on the figure of the Angel of history 
suggest the possibility of an interpretation of what this ‘making use’ might entail. Benjamin 
makes use of the fragments of tht  Arcades Project, he collects the rags and refuse that escape 
monological historical research, towards the possibility of a redeemed knowledge, towards 
the possibility of the felicitous naming of the unnameable. Benjamin’s work must remain a
82
work in progress until the coming time when the coordinates of profane judgement and 
divine judgement are united in the redemption of pure name. Benjamin does not ‘finish’ the 
A rcades Project because it methodologically does not give itself over to subjectively 
determined completion. The work succeeds in ‘neutralizing’ subject and object to the extent 
that it effaces authorial intention and the moment of decision, which would declare the work 
to be finished. Benjamin’s eyes must remain open to the ‘catastrophe’ that is the unfolding of 
historical materialist research. His mouth remains open, as it is not for him to decide when 
name w ill be restored to human speech.
3.4 Concluding Remarks
/
From a distance the fragmentary and unresolved historical materialist program developed by 
Benjamin from the 1920s .until his death in 1940 couldn’t be farther removed from the 
systematic and rigorously explicative structure of the Kantian project. Where Kant offers 
concrete accounts of the anatomical structure of human knowledge and experience, 
Benjamin merely gestures towards the abstract requirements of a rigorously transcendental 
philosophy. Where Kant bequeaths the system as his legacy, Benjamin merely leaves books 
of notes and citations. Kant’s legacy , demands to be read as the labour of philosophy, 
whereas Benjamin’s heritage, especially conceived through th e  Arcades Project, reads as the 
trace of organized circumstance.
Benjamin resolved in a letter to Gershom Scholem in 1917 to attempt to ‘set in 
granite’ and ‘universally develop’ the Kantian system (CB, 97). In concluding this project we 
affirm that the discrepancies between the literary and philosophical outputs of Kant and 
Benjamin recede under scrutiny. The differences do not mark a dissolute or unfulfilled break,
but rather mark Benjamin’s appropriate stylistic response to the development o f the spirit of 
the Kantian system.
In Kant Benjamin discovered an intellectual honesty which he took to be unique in 
the tradition. With the exception of Plato, Benjamin affirmed that Kant was the only figure 
in the history of philosophy to pursue clarity and justification for their own sake. The result 
of Kant’s labours is a system of philosophy that drastically limits its scope. Compared with 
the 17th-century systems of metaphysics (Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz) which came before 
him, Kant’s critical system appears to be minimalistic in its fundamental conclusions. It is as 
if  Kant was the first thinker in the modem tradition to recognize the staggering demands 
which the question of truth announces. Kant’s virtue is his pursuit of this truth. The clarity 
and justification which underpin his findings are the result. YetTCant is not faithful to his 
own demands in every facet of his project. For all of Kant’s efforts he continued to harbour 
contingent metaphysical assumptions, especially his presumption of subject-object causation, 
which barred him from an adequate confrontation with ephemeral experience.
Benjamin attempts to excise the concepts of subject and object from the Kantian 
system. But in doing so Benjamin challenges the very form of philosophy. The 
transcendental, which can be neatly defined within the Kantian conceptual framework, 
attains a fundamental ambiguity in a philosophy which rejects a clear cut distinction between 
subject and object. Benjamin’s philosophy must overturn both the pre-Kantian orientation to 
the determination of objects and the Kantian orientation to the determination of the 
mechanics of subjectivity, while maintaining its fidelity to the pursuit of clarity and 
justification in its conclusions. Benjamin’s thought excised the question of authorial intention 
or agency, a position which had a growing influence on western philosophy in the last half 
century. The result is a body of writings which cohere from the perspective of their
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generative principle, but diverge in their specificity. Benjamin’s concluding remark of “On 
the Coming Philosophy” maintains that “[ejxperience is the uniform and continuous 
multiplicity of knowledge” (SW 1,108). The historical materialist philosopher writes the truth 
of this experience. The works which result are functions of the multiplicity of knowing.
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